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THE POWER TO WAGE WAR SUCCESSFULLY
Matthew C. Waxman*
A century ago and in the midst of American involvement in World
War I, future Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes delivered one of the
most influential lectures on the Constitution in wartime. In it he uttered
his famous axiom that “the power to wage war is the power to wage war
successfully.” That statement continues to echo in modern jurisprudence,
though the background and details of the lecture have not previously
been explored in detail. Drawing on Hughes’s own research notes, this
Article examines his 1917 formulation and shows how Hughes pre-
sciently applied it to the most pressing war powers issues of its day—
namely, a national draft and intrusive federal economic regulation.
Though critical to supporting American military operations in Europe,
these were primarily questions about Congress’s domestic authority—not
the sorts of interbranch issues that naturally come to mind today in
thinking about “waging war.” This Article also shows, however, how
Hughes struggled unsuccessfully to define when war powers should
turn off or revert to peacetime powers. The story of Hughes’s defense of
(and later worry about) expansive wartime powers in World War I sheds
much light on present constitutional war powers and debates about
them, including in the context of indefinite and sweeping wars against
transnational terrorist groups.
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INTRODUCTION
Shortly after 8:00 PM on September 5, 1917, Charles Evans Hughes
addressed the participants of the American Bar Association’s annual
meeting at Saratoga Casino in Saratoga Springs, New York.1 The former
Supreme Court Justice had stepped down from the High Court to run
for President in 1916 and narrowly lost the race to incumbent President
Woodrow Wilson less than a year earlier.2 Now, Hughes rose to the
podium to deliver a powerful legal defense of the Wilson Administration’s
controversial wartime actions—actions taken in a global war from which
Wilson had only recently campaigned to keep America out.3
Titled “War Powers Under the Constitution,”4 the speech attracted
nationwide attention.5 The New York Times covered it on page one; “War
Power Ample, Hughes Declares,” ran the headline.6 At this time, the
1. Am. Bar Ass’n, Program of Meeting at Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 3 A.B.A. J. 305, 324
(1917).
2. 1 Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes 315–34, 362 (1951) (detailing the 1916
presidential nomination process and election).
3. See George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations
Since 1776, at 404–07 (2008) (outlining Wilson’s position against American involvement
in the war and actions to bring the war to a close).
4. Charles E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 40 Ann. Rep. A.B.A.,
1917, at 232 [hereinafter Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution].
5. Pusey, supra note 2, at 370.
6. War Power Ample, Hughes Declares, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1917, at 1. Other
newspapers reported on it at length as well. See, e.g., American Bar Indicts Germany for
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850540 
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United States was five months into its participation in the Great War—a
conflict that had already destroyed much of Europe and extended to
many other parts of the globe.7 During those short months the United
States had built from near scratch a massive army unlike any American
force before it. In doing so, the federal government had assumed unpre-
cedented powers over American society.8
It was in that address that Hughes famously proclaimed that “[t]he
power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully”9—a line that
continues to be quoted often by lawyers, judges, and scholars.10 Hughes
concluded the speech with rhetorical flourish:
It has been said that the constitution marches. That is,
there are constantly new applications of unchanged powers, and
it is ascertained that in novel and complex situations, the old
grants contain, in their general words and true significance,
needed and adequate authority. So, also, we have a fighting
constitution.11
Yet Hughes’s address was not a political rallying speech.12 It was,
rather, a meticulously researched and lawyerly presentation that carefully
elaborated these “fighting constitution” principles and assessed the Wilson
Administration’s wartime challenges in light of them.
No single document from World War I better articulates the consti-
tutional war powers framework that prevailed at that time among the
legal and political elite and the application of that framework to the most
Illegal Acts, N.Y. Trib., Sept. 6, 1917, at 3; German Methods of War Scored, S.F. Chron.,
Sept. 6, 1917, at 15. The speech was also widely distributed. For example, one major paper
reprinted the entire speech in its Sunday opinion page later that week. Charles E. Hughes,
War Powers Under the Constitution, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1917, at 1, 11.
7. See John Keegan, The First World War 376–77, 401–02 (1998) (noting that while
Wilson initially said America was “too proud to fight,” his view changed after a “succession
of diplomatic affronts”); David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American
Society 3–44 (1980) [hereinafter Kennedy, Over Here] (describing Wilson’s reluctance,
from 1914–1916, to enter the war as overcome only by a combination of the Russian
Revolution, the Zimmermann telegram, and the German U-boat attacks on U.S. ships).
8. See infra notes 152–155 and accompanying text (describing massive increase in
size of military); see also infra notes 206–219 and accompanying text (describing wartime
military, economic, and administrative enactments).
9. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 238.
10. See infra notes 17–29.
11. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 248.
12. In contrast, two days earlier the former Secretary of War and Secretary of State
Elihu Root had delivered to the same audience a rousing defense of American efforts to
defeat the German menace, including general statements that long-term defense of
American democracy would require wartime compromises of peacetime liberties. Give War
Alarm, Root Urges Bar, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1917, at 1. Root’s remarks included presenting
to the American Bar Association a set of patriotic resolutions. Transactions of the Fortieth
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 40 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 19, 25–26 (1917)
(reprinting Root’s statement).
616 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:613
pressing contemporary policy questions13—not questions about entering
the war or how to fight it on the battlefield, but about Congress’s power
to revamp relations between the national government and citizenry. These
domestically focused questions arose both from changes in the nature of
warfare and from changes in America’s role in world affairs.14 Hughes’s
“fighting constitution” speech is a vivid picture that captures not only the
subject’s exquisite features but also its energetic actions in rapid motion.
There is some irony that Hughes’s voice—and in particular his axiom
that “[t]he constitutional power to wage war is the power to wage war
successfully”—would reverberate so influentially in war powers jurispru-
dence given that he never judged a major war powers case. He served first
as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court from 1910 to 1916 and then
again as Chief Justice from 1930 to 1941.15 These happened to be relatively
peaceful, dry spells for significant war powers cases, with both of Hughes’s
terms ending less than a year before the United States declared war.16
Yet Hughes’s war powers speech would echo loudly in subsequent
jurisprudence.17 As Chief Justice, Hughes himself would restate in dicta,
in a 1934 case about a state mortgage law enacted to deal with Great
Depression economic emergency, that the war power “is a power to wage
war successfully.”18 Highlighting some of that proposition’s evident dangers,
the Supreme Court invoked Hughes’s statement of the war power in World
War II cases upholding discriminatory government orders, including in-
ternment, imposed on Japanese Americans.19 In 1948, the Supreme Court
13. Indeed, Congress took close notice of the speech, which was entered almost
immediately into the House and Senate records. S. Res. 134, 65th Cong. (1917) (enacted);
55 Cong. Rec. 6886 (1917) (statement of Rep. Steele); 55 Cong. Rec. 6836 (1917) (statement
of Sen. James).
14. See Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How the First World War Created
Modern America 7 (2016) (“[World War I] occurred precisely as Americans were debating
the role that a newly powerful United States should play in the world.”).
15. See Pusey, supra note 2, at 271–81 (describing Hughes’s 1910 nomination); 2 id.
at 648–63 (describing Hughes’s 1930 nomination).
16. To be sure, Hughes did have a few occasions to rule on marginal or tangential
war powers issues. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 326–28 (1936)
(finding Congress’s war powers gave ample authority for the Wilson Dam project on the
Tennessee River); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 394–404 (1932) (considering an
allegation of property rights violations due to the Texas governor’s assertion of military
emergency powers).
17. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1944)
(quoting Hughes’s 1917 address in support of Congress’s authority to provide housing for
individuals engaged in national-defense activities); Weightman v. United States, 142 F.2d
188, 191 (1st Cir. 1944) (quoting Hughes’s axiom in support of Congress’s authority to
impose duties on conscientious objectors).
18. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
19. Most prominently, Chief Justice Stone recited it in his majority opinion upholding
wartime curfews. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943). And in Korematsu v.
United States, Justice Frankfurter quoted Hughes’s dictum from Blaisdell in his concurrence
upholding the internment order. 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
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quoted Hughes’s “fighting constitution” speech extensively in Lichter v.
United States—so extensively it was as if the majority were reprinting the
speech officially into the Supreme Court’s records.20 Relying again on
Hughes’s axiom, the Court held it to be within Congress’s power to
authorize recovery of excessive profits from government contractors of
wartime goods.21
In the hundred years since the speech, the Executive Branch has fre-
quently summoned Hughes’s “power to wage war successfully” formula-
tion, and the 1917 speech in which he issued it, to justify its actions. In
World War II, for example, the Roosevelt Administration recited this line
in defending its defense-industry price controls.22 After that conflict and
in the context of a budding Cold War, the U.S. Attorney General relied
on the line in opining that universal military training programs would be
constitutional.23
Much more recently, Hughes’s axiom featured in the Bush
Administration’s Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel memo-
randa justifying the domestic use of military force against terrorists24 and
the use of military commissions to try certain terrorism suspects.25 The
Obama Administration cited it in contesting Guantanamo Bay–detainee
see also Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 Yale L.J. 489, 530
(1945) (“The war power is the power to wage war successfully, as Chief Justice Hughes
once remarked. But it is the power to wage war, not a license to do unnecessary and
dictatorial things in the name of the war power.”).
20. 334 U.S. 742 (1948). One of several block quotes from Hughes’s speech takes up
two full pages of this opinion in the U.S. Reports. Id. at 780–82. Significant parts of the
speech are also quoted in footnotes. Id. at 757 n.4, 767 n.9, 779 n.31.
21. Id. at 782–89.
22. See David Ginsburg, Legal Aspects of Price Control in the Defense Program: A
Presentation of the Views of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, 27
A.B.A. J. 527, 528 (1941) (invoking Hughes’s speech in support of major rearmament in
the run-up to the U.S. entry to World War II). The Roosevelt Administration repeatedly
invoked Hughes’s 1917 speech in its presentations to the House Committee on Banking
and Currency in defense of these price-control programs. See, e.g., A Bill to Further the
National Defense and Security by Checking Speculative and Excessive Price Rises, Price
Dislocation, and Inflationary Tendencies, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 5479
Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 77th Cong. 64, 302, 316 (1941).
23. See Authority to Establish System of Universal Military Training, 1 Op. O.L.C.
Supp. 17, 22 (1947) (quoting Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426).
24. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. & Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President & William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., on Authority for Use
of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States 15 (Oct. 23, 2001),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memomilitaryforceco
mbatus10232001.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CUC-DETC].
25. Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists, 25 Op. O.L.C. 238,
245 (2001).
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habeas cases.26 Although it has over time been invoked to support expan-
sive presidential commander-in-chief authority,27 the examination below
shows that Hughes’s original statement in 1917 of the “power to wage
war successfully”28 was about Congress’s constitutional authority.29
This Article tells the neglected story of constitutional war powers
and their exercise in the World War I period, as they were expounded,
defended, and, later, criticized by Hughes. Part I examines Hughes’s
speech and draws on his personal research notes to elaborate what he
meant by a “fighting constitution” that confers the “power to wage war suc-
cessfully.” That Part then investigates the relationship between Hughes’s
theory and the evolution in American military power and security needs.
Prior to 1917, this notion that the American constitutional blueprint was
designed for a highly adaptive war-making machine competed with
several contrary visions. One alternative insisted that many constitutional
constraints are simply not applicable in wartime.30 Another held that
constitutional constraints remained firmly and absolutely in place during
wartime, despite difficulties they might pose for waging war effectively.31
Rejecting these alternatives, Hughes proffered a theory of war powers
that expand in wartime to accommodate the ever-changing demands of na-
tional defense. Hughes by no stretch invented the core idea that constitu-
tional powers must match unpredictable and evolving security exigencies;32
26. Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 6 n.2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litig., Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
27. See infra notes 364–366 and accompanying text (describing President Roosevelt’s
unilateralism); see also, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (invoking the Hughes axiom of the federal war power as the power to
“‘wage war successfully’” in support of the President’s authority to make extraterritorial
enemy property designations (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943))),
cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005); William G. Howell, Wartime Judgments of Presidential
Power: Striking Down but Not Back, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1778, 1788 (2009) (associating
Hughes’s statement with expansive theories of commander-in-chief powers); Douglas W.
Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President’s War Power Necessarily
Remains “The Power to Wage War Successfully,” 53 Drake L. Rev. 851, 894 (2005) (“Once
the President is given legislative authority and appropriation, as he has, the Constitution
allocates the war power to a Commander in Chief who can act with energy and dispatch.”).
28. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 238, 248.
29. See infra notes 45, 74, 81–83 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., 2 Westel Woodbury Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United
States 1212 (1910) [hereinafter Willoughby, Constitutional Law] (“[C]onstitutional power
. . . to declare and wage war, whether foreign or civil, carries with it the authority to use all
means calculated to weaken the enemy and to bring the struggle to a successful conclu-
sion.”). Hughes cites this treatise in his 1917 speech, see Hughes, War Powers Under the
Constitution, supra note 4, at 245, and his own hand-written research notes contain many
references to it, see H. Jefferson Powell, The President as Commander in Chief 162–64
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he credits Alexander Hamilton33 for laying the idea’s foundation in The
Federalist Papers, for example, and President Lincoln for putting it into
action during the Civil War—a conflict that generated many legal precur-
sors to the specific powers Hughes discusses.34 But Hughes both expanded
on the theory and lent special political and intellectual credibility to this
understanding at a time of simultaneous upheaval in constitutional law
and in military technology and strategy.35 By the end of the war there was
little left of rival theories.36
Part II details Hughes’s application of his general war powers frame-
work to the sudden collision of, on the legal side, Lochner -era jurispru-
dence and cautious Progressive-era administrative development with, on
the military side, the onset of “total war”37 requiring complete economic
(2014) (discussing the constitutional axiom that the national government has all the powers
needed to protect the Republic).
33. See Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 239.
34. See id. at 234–35; see also Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1870)
(“[T]he [war] power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of enemy
forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of
the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress.”); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (“Congress has
the power not only to raise and support and govern armies, but to declare war. It has,
therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends
to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success . . . .”).
35. See David J. Barron, Waging War: The Clash Between Presidents and Congress—
1776 to ISIS 221 (2016) (describing Hughes’s special credibility on such matters); William
B. Fisch, Emergency in the Constitutional Law of the United States, 38 Am. J. Comp. L.
Supplement 389, 393 (1990) (calling Hughes’s 1917 speech “[p]erhaps the most often-
quoted assertion” of the view that constitutional powers should be interpreted to provide
the government with whatever power is necessary to meet an emergency).
36. To be sure, a variant of the first alternative—arguing that the President’s war and
foreign affairs powers derive not from the Constitution but are instead inherent in the
idea of sovereignty—continued to hold some sway into the mid-twentieth century. See
infra note 81 (discussing Justice Sutherland’s articulation of this view, expressed in dicta in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), and elsewhere).
37. Although the term “total war” did not enter popular usage until the Second
World War, the term itself derives from the First. Historian Hew Strachan notes that
Georges Clemenceau’s government talked in 1917 about la guerre integ-
rale to indicate its intention of abandoning all restraint in mobilizing
French society for war. In 1918, Léon Daudet published a summons to
national mobilization called La guerre totale, in which he defined total
war as the extension of the struggle into the realms of politics, the
economy, commerce, industry, intellectual life, the law, and finance.
Hew Strachan, Essay and Reflection: On Total War and Modern War, 22 Int’l Hist. Rev.
341, 348 (2000) (footnote omitted); see also Ian F. W. Beckett, The Great War 1914–1918,
at 242 (2001) (noting also that the German General Erich Ludendorff used the term “in
his memoirs in 1919 and, again, in his polemic in 1935, Der Totale Krieg”).
This Article uses the term broadly—seeing total war as “imply[ing] the breakdown of
the distinction between organized combat and the societies, economies, and political
systems that support it”—while recognizing that “a compelling definition of the term . . .
continue[s] to frustrate historians,” and noting that the debate whether World War I was
itself “total” remains unresolved. Roger Chickering & Stig Förster, Introduction, in The
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and social mobilization. In that context, the most salient aspects of war
powers—expanded Article I legislative authority, loosened restrictions on
congressional delegations of policy discretion to the executive branch,
and accommodating interpretations of individual rights—were all ori-
ented toward the national government’s domestic role. That Part examines
in particular the application of Hughes’s axiom of successful war-waging
to the most significant wartime legislative actions of that moment—namely,
the massive national draft of an expeditionary army and the vast expan-
sion of economic regulation and administration on the home front.
During the remainder of World War I, all three branches of govern-
ment essentially embraced Hughes’s view. The military demands of
modern warfare stretched the Constitution in new ways. There remained
intense doctrinal and political debate about what specifically “the power
to wage war successfully” meant in practice, but by the end of the war
there was no longer any serious debate either that the Constitution’s
provisions apply in wartime or that its substantive content would require
substantial adaptation to defend the nation in modern war.38
Yet, having had his view vindicated during the long, drawn-out end
to the war, Hughes began to harbor significant anxieties about the very
legal developments he presaged and defended. Part III examines how
those anxieties are reflected in a little-known case, Commercial Cable Co. v.
Burleson, that Hughes litigated unsuccessfully before esteemed District
Judge Learned Hand in New York.39 Hughes’s comfort with vast war
powers assumed—crucially—clear and workable delineations between
peace and (temporary) war and that extensive war powers would retract
upon victory. Hughes also assumed that the reasonable necessity of
means to achieve war aims could be objectively measured. But Hughes
witnessed an erosion of those assumptions during and after World War I,
and they would be even further eroded around the time of his death
after World War II. The Burleson episode and its aftermath show that
Hughes’s formulation contains two key shortcomings: most obviously, the
danger associated with the unbounded indeterminacy of “the power to
wage war”; and more subtly but as important, how much its output
depends on defining “success” in war.40
Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939, at 3, 6–7
(Roger Chickering et al. eds., 2003).
38. See infra notes 247–255 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
consistent validation of expansive World War I economic regulation and administration).
39. Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 F. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
40. Not surprisingly, given its timing only a few months after the American war
declaration, Hughes’s speech dedicates relatively little space to the outer limits of war
powers. A sparse outline of the speech contained in his personal notes contains the un-
derlined phrase “reasonably necessary.” Charles Evans Hughes, Outline of Argument 2
(unpublished document) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Hughes,
Outline], in Charles Evans Hughes Papers, 1914–1930, Columbia Univ. Rare Book &
Manuscript Library, box 56 [hereinafter CEH Papers]. Notably, several pages of Hughes’s
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This Article concludes that dissecting Hughes’s century-old formu-
lation and defense of our “fighting constitution” not only exposes much
about the past but also about present debates over the scope of constitu-
tional war powers. World War I rarely features in current discussions of
war powers and their evolution, probably because it was formally de-
clared by Congress and lacked the most excessive violations of civil
liberties as measured against modern constitutional rights or the Second
World War.41 But it was the pivotal moment in American history when the
legal space between national government powers in wartime and peace-
time—different in degree and in kind from the Civil War, and validated
by all three branches of government—reached its apex. This was the
historical juncture of maximum differential between the federal govern-
ment’s exceptional war powers and its normal, peacetime powers.
Placing Hughes’s theory in today’s legal and strategic context thus
reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that the stakes of modern war power debates
are in many ways lower than often supposed. Today, many of the vast
government powers that were in Hughes’s era reserved for wartime—and
not just military powers but economic regulatory powers, too—have
become normalized; they are now regular features of our peacetime
governmental landscape. Modern fixation on presidential unilateralism
in military affairs overlooks the many other dimensions of the constitu-
tional order in wartime that have shifted just as dramatically.
Current unease about the implications of indefinite and wide-
encompassing war against nonstate terrorist threats like al Qaeda and the
notes appear not in his own hand but in that of his research assistant, identified only as
“S.S.G.”
41. This comparison to World War II, in particular the policies directed at Japanes
Americans discussed above, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, is not meant to
dismiss the significant World War I restrictions on free expression. Most notably, after
Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918—which criminal-
ized attempts to interfere with or resist the war effort—the Wilson Administration aggre-
ssively prosecuted hundreds of cases against publishers and dissenters. See David M.
Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years 249–55 (1997) (describing the legislative his-
tory of the Espionage Act); see also Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The
Ambiguous Legacy Civil Libertarianism 75–76 (1991) (noting additionally that “[m]any
states followed suit, passing new laws or enforcing older ones in ways that significantly
curtailed radical critiques of American politics”); Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words:
Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech 17–18 (1995) (noting “[t]housands of
people were” imprisoned during the war “for comment no stronger than” the facts of
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 207–08 (1919), wherein the defendant was con-
victed for publishing “twelve articles of small circulation that were favorable to Germany”
and mildly promoted draft resistance). For a famous contemporary account deeply critical
of the wartime restrictions, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32
Harv. L. Rev. 932 (1919); see also G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age:
The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 299, 316–
23 (1996) (discussing Chaffee’s defense of free speech). The issue of speech and dissent in
World War I, and Hughes’s view of it, is taken up further below. See infra notes 233–236
and accompanying text.
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so-called Islamic State also often ignores revealing historical antecedents
from previous eras of strategic change.42 This new look at World War I,
and the ways it dramatically reshaped relations between the national
government and citizenry, shows that a war usually regarded as so legally
ordinary—it was, after all, a declared war pitting one group of states
against another—sheds light on today’s very unconventional wars against
terrorists.
I. OUR “FIGHTING CONSTITUTION”
Today the biggest constitutional war powers debates tend to revolve
around interbranch questions, especially whether the President or the
Congress has primary responsibility for the initiation of military action.43
These are, in some sense, second-order questions. For most of our
history, the much more significant legal debates centered on the first-
order question of the overall scope of national government powers in
wartime. Until the Korean War, followed by the Vietnam War and
enactment of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, there was not much
dispute that Congress held the keys with respect to going to war, even if
the President had powers to use force on his own in certain, limited
circumstances.44
42. These anxieties, reflected in much modern scholarship and commentary, are
discussed further below. See infra notes 407–414 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution 1 (2013) [hereinafter
Griffin, Long Wars] (discussing the focus of modern war powers debates on unilateral
presidential warmaking); John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace 143–60 (2005) (dis-
cussing modern constitutional debates over presidential war initiation); Mariah Zeisberg,
War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority 51 (2013) (emphasizing war powers
controversies about initiating conflict).
44. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 29, 66–67
(1972) (“The historical record . . . confirms the statement by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee [S. Rep. No. 90-797, at 24 (1967)] that ‘only since 1950 have Presidents
regarded themselves as having authority to commit the armed forces to full scale and
sustained warfare.’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-797, at 24 (1967)).
On Korea, see Griffin, Long Wars, supra note 43, at 31–35 (discussing the Korean
War as “inaugurat[ing] a new era of ‘presidential wars’” because its legal authority was a
“novel doctrine based centrally on the president’s Article II powers over foreign affairs
and as commander in chief”); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 127–76
(Mariner Books 2004) (1973) (“Korea beguiled the American government . . . into an
unprecedented claim for inherent presidential power to go to war.”); Francis D. Wormuth
et al., To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law 28 (2d ed.
1989) (“Until 1950, no judge, no President, no legislator, no commentator ever suggested
that the President had legal authority to initiate war.”).
On Vietnam, see Schlesinger, supra, at 177–207 (noting that Presidents Johnson and
Nixon, in expanding and prosecuting the war, “almost came to see the sharing of power
with Congress in foreign policy as a derogation of the Presidency” and “Congress, in
increasing self-abasement, almost came to love its impotence”).
On the 1973 War Powers Resolution, see Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy
102–13 (1990) (describing the failure of the War Powers Resolution to effectively constrain
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Hughes’s speech highlights that the most contentious and conse-
quential war powers questions of the First World War were not about the
President’s power to use military force, or even much about the President’s
powers at all. They were about the scope of Congress’s legislative powers
in waging wars once started.45
By way of context, World War I had broken out in Europe in July
1914.46 For decades the major European states—Britain, France, Germany,
Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire—had maintained a
precarious peace based on a balance of power. But a web of alliances and
presidential behavior); Schlesinger, supra at 301–07, 433–35 (noting that the resolution
has only heightened the interbranch dispute on when Presidents may use the military
unilaterally).
To be sure, after World War I, there was a significant political debate about whether
Congress’s prerogatives with regard to initiating war still made resort to war easy. One
result of that debate was a proposed constitutional amendment (the so-called “Ludlow
Amendment”), which narrowly failed to pass Congress, that would have required a popu-
lar referendum to declare war prior to any congressional war declaration. See generally
Walter R. Griffin, Louis Ludlow and the War Referendum Crusade 1935–1941, 64 Ind.
Mag. Hist. 267, 273–85 (1968) (describing the congressional debate surrounding the
Ludlow Amendment and noting how “the shift of a mere eleven votes would have turned
defeat into at least a temporary victory for . . . the war referendum advocates”).
45. Scholarship on war powers was at this time very thin. This was in part due to the
fact that the prior major American war, against Spain in 1898, had generated little
constitutional controversy. See Clinton Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander
in Chief 41 (expanded ed. 1976) (1951) [hereinafter Rossiter, The Supreme Court and
the Commander in Chief] (“The Spanish-American War certainly raised no controversies
of any basic importance over presidential or congressional war powers . . . .”).
The leading constitutional law treatise at the time was, as noted above, Westel
Willoughby’s Constitutional Law of the United States, and Hughes drew on that text in resear-
ching his 1917 speech. See supra note 32. Even Willoughby’s chapter on “Military Law,”
however, focuses mostly on constitutional limits to actions by military forces. See Willoughby,
Constitutional Law, supra note 32, at 1190–227. His short section on “The Prosecution of
War” contains a few sweeping statements with little explanation. See, e.g., id. at 1212 (“When
dealing with the enemy all acts that are calculated to advance this end are legal.”); id.
(“[T]he power to wage war enables the government to override in many particulars private
rights which in time of peace are inviolable.”). A possible explanation can be found in a
later chapter of Willoughby’s, in which he describes his view of the general police power of
the state.
[M]ore fundamental than the right of the private individual is the right
of the public person, the State, and more important than the conve-
nience or even the existence of the citizen are the welfare and life of the
civic whole, and thus we find that, fundamentally, no system of political
and legal philosophy, save that of pure anarchism, can start with the
individual . . . . [I]t is necessary that the State . . . should possess the power
in all cases of need to subordinate private rights to public necessities.
Thus every state has [among others,] the power . . . to compel them to
serve in its armies . . . .
Id. at 1230.
46. The First World War has been exhaustively examined by historians for a century.
Authoritative general histories of the war include Beckett, supra note 37; Keegan, supra
note 7; see also Martin Gilbert, First World War (1994); Max Hastings, Catastrophe 1914:
Europe Goes to War (2013).
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plans for rapid military mobilization allowed a spark of conflict in the
Balkans to drag all of Europe into a massive conflagration that drained
its economies and killed millions of its soldiers in brutal trench warfare.
By 1917, the United States was reluctantly pulled into the war on the side
of Britain and France by, among other factors, German submarine assaults
on American vessels.47 Wilson requested from Congress a declaration of
war against Germany on April 2, 1917, pledging not only to defend the
United States from immediate aggression but also to prevent the war’s
future recurrence and make the world “safe for democracy.”48 Congress
quickly obliged.49
Throughout his speech five months later, Hughes moved back and
forth between a general theory of war powers and its specific application
to the biggest legal questions at that time. This Part and the next
therefore adopt a similar organization, first analyzing his general frame-
work and then, in the following Part, exploring Hughes’s treatment of
particular government actions.
A. A “Fighting” Constitution
The central idea of the speech—that we have a “fighting constitu-
tion” that includes the “power to wage war successfully”50—might appear
initially an obvious and indisputable choice about constitutional architec-
ture. Quoting Justice Story, whose early-nineteenth-century constitutional
Commentaries Hughes drew upon in researching his speech, Hughes
argues in the opening paragraphs that these principles animated the
design of the Constitution from the very start: “Self-preservation is the
first law of national life and the constitution itself provides the necessary
powers in order to defend and preserve the United States.”51 According
to Hughes’s own reading of the Constitution’s drafting history:
The framers of the constitution were under no illusions as to
war . . . . In equipping the National Government with the needed
authority in war, they tolerated no limitations inconsistent with
that object, as they realized that the very existence of the Nation
might be at stake and that every resource of the people must be
at command.52
47. See Herring, supra note 3, at 398–410; Keegan, supra note 7, at 402.
48. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a
Declaration of War Against Germany (Apr. 2, 1917), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=65366 [http://perma.cc/49DA-AZR9] [hereinafter, Wilson, Declaration of War
Against Germany].
49. Act of Apr. 6, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (enacted) (“That the state of war between the
United States and the Imperial German Government . . . is hereby formally declared . . . .”).
50. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 238, 248.
51. Id. at 232.
52. Id. at 238–39.
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In a set of handwritten notes that appear to be a rough outline of Hughes’s
main points about “successful war” powers, he penciled that war is “not
an experimental policy” but an endeavor that “must be won.”53
The notion, however, that the Framers designed the Constitution to
effectively wage and win any war the nation engaged in was, in fact, never
so clear. Probably the most significant and long-running debate about
war and American constitutional design is over this very question: Is the
Constitution designed to be optimally capable of waging war, or does its
system of checks and balances accept certain friction—even friction that
dangerously undermines wartime effectiveness—as the price of safe-
guarding other values?54
Upon the United States’ entry into the Great War, Hughes was
debating two other major traditions that had held a significant place in
American constitutional debates. One view saw war powers as exceptions
to the Constitution, powers lying entirely outside the constitutional
framework. Another view saw the Constitution as not merely applying to
war powers but as designed to strictly constrain the particular means by
which wars were to be waged. Hughes advanced a powerful alternative
view, one that gained immediate traction in World War I and has tri-
umphed ever since: The Constitution regulates war-waging, but many
constitutional restraints must adapt in wartime to changes in the way wars
are actually fought.55
The first view saw the Constitution as imposing few or no limits on
how wars are waged. Hughes stated in the opening paragraph of his
speech that one of his intended audiences was those “who in their zeal
impatiently and without thought put the constitution aside as having no
relation to these times.”56 If there were any legal constraints on waging
war, they were extraconstitutional, such as the dictates of international
law.57 John Quincy Adams, for example, had argued in 1836 before the
House of Representatives:
53. Hughes, Outline, supra note 40, at 1.
54. Justice Frankfurter, addressing this debate, comes down firmly on the latter side.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 613–14
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that despite the drawbacks the United States
faces in wartime compared to authoritarian governments, “[i]t has not been our tradition
to envy such governments”).
55. These three views of war powers map onto typologies of more general views of
emergency power and constitutionalism, though labels vary. See Oren Gross & Fionnuala
Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis 9–12 (2006) (categorizing varying approaches to
emergency law); Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in The
Constitution in Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency 39, 39–40 (Mark Tushnet
ed., 2005) (same); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale
L.J. 1385, 1386–97 (1989) (same).
56. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 232.
57. See Martin S. Lederman, If George Washington Did It, Does that Make It
Constitutional?: History’s Lessons for Wartime Military Tribunals, Geo. L.J. (forthcoming
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There are . . . two classes of powers, altogether different in
their nature, and often incompatible with each other—the war
power and peace power. The peace power is limited by regu-
lations and restricted by provisions, prescribed within the con-
stitution itself. The war power is limited only by the laws and
usages of nations. The power is tremendous: it is strictly consti-
tutional, but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected
for the protection of liberty, of property, and of life.58
Hughes’s research notes for the speech contain several references59
to William Whiting’s treatise, War Powers Under the Constitution, the last
edition of which was published in 1871. Whiting, who served during the
Civil War as the lawyer to the War Department,60 describes the Framers’
intent to create a set of defined and limited powers for peacetime but
constitutionally unlimited powers in wartime, emphasizing that the only
remedy for abuse of the latter is to elect new leaders through the political
process.61 When the United States entered World War I in 1917, some
members of Congress clung to this view.62
2017) (manuscript at 46–47), http://srrn.com/abstract=2840948 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (discussing prominent view before and during the Civil War that when the
federal government exercises its belligerent authorities, constitutional constraints are
displaced by international laws of war). Professor Lobel describes this pre–Civil War view
somewhat differently:
Emergency and normal times were counterposed, resulting in distinct
legal regimes. . . . [encompassing] two spheres: normal constitutional
conduct, inhabited by law [and] universal rules . . . ; and a realm where
universal rules are inadequate to meet the particular emergency
situation and where law must be replaced by discretion and politics.
Lobel, supra note 55, at 1388–90.
58. 12 Reg. Deb. 4038 (1836).
59. Charles Evans Hughes, Military and the Constitution Notes 2 (1917) (unpublished
document) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), in CEH Papers, supra note 40; Charles
Evans Hughes, War Powers—Are They Unlimited Under the Constitution? Notes (1917)
(unpublished document) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), in CEH Papers, supra
note 40.
60. John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code 205 (2012).
61. William Whiting, War Powers Under the Constitution of the United States 27
(43d ed., N.Y., Lee & Shephard 1871). During the Civil War, some Radical Republicans like
Congressman Thaddeus Stevens and Senator Charles Sumner took a similar view with
regard to the war against secessionist states. See James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems
Under Lincoln 30–31 (1926) (“Extreme advocates of the war power held that the
Constitution is not operative during such a crisis as the Civil War presented.”). For a
critical take on Whiting’s constitutional commentary, see Mark E. Neely Jr., Lincoln and
the Triumph of the Nation: Constitutional Conflict in the American Civil War 80–85
(2011) (arguing Whiting’s “slippery advocacy” contained “ideas [that] did hinge on very
liberal construction of the Constitution—and ultimately not on the Constitution at all but
on international law”).
62. Christopher May describes three contemporary Congressmen’s views on the war
power:
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Another, more strict or formalistic view of constitutional war powers
regarded limits as immovable or unbending, even in wartime.63 This view
is appealing if one assumes that constitutionally permissible means of
waging war, even if firmly limited, are still ample enough to meet plausi-
ble security needs and removing those limits dangerously opens up the
system to abuse.
During the War of 1812, then-Congressman Daniel Webster took this
opposing perspective in rejecting a federal draft as beyond the limits of
constitutional power (a debate taken up below64): “The tyranny of
Arbitrary Government consists as much in its means as in its ends.”65 A
problem, Webster argued, with loosening restrictions on means to achieve
even imperative ends is that it perversely rewards government mismana-
gement of the limited tools provided for in the Constitution.66 The strict,
formalistic view also features in the Supreme Court’s landmark 1866 Ex
parte Milligan decision.67 Denying that either the President or Congress
could authorize military tribunals to prosecute civilians in Civil War areas
in which the civilian courts were able to function properly, and further
stating that only an actual invasion of American soil could permit a state
of martial law,68 the five-Justice majority in that case declared: “No doc-
trine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the
James Lewis of Illinois explained to the Senate in 1917 that “the
Constitution, at this particular time, is more or less suspended . . . .”
Representative Courtney Hamlin of Missouri quoted Miller’s statement
[78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305 (1871)] that “upon the exercise of these
[war] powers no restrictions are imposed,” suggesting it was proof that
the Court would not invalidate laws adopted under the war powers.
Georgia’s Thomas Hardwick told his Senate colleagues in June 1917,
“You can violate the Constitution . . . as much as you please and as often
as your conscience will let you; there is no remedy for that, unless our
Supreme Court will pluck up a little additional courage; there is . . . no
redress for that except in the forum of conscience and morals.”
Christopher N. May, In the Name of War: Judicial Review and the War Powers Since 1918,
at 20 (1989) (quoting 55 Cong. Rec. 4462 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hardwick); 55 Cong.
Rec. 4459 (1917) (statement of Sen. Lewis); 55 Cong. Rec. 3888 (1917) (statement of Rep.
Hamlin)). Indeed, May notes that outside Congress, some executive branch officials also
believed that in war, “‘[t]he Fifth Amendment . . . does not operate against the exercise of
the war power . . . . The courts are shut to suitors who would obstruct the Executive in the
prosecution of the war.’” Id. at 21 (quoting A. Mitchell Palmer, The Great Work of the
Alien Property Custodian, 53 Am. L. Rev. 43, 55 (1919)).
63. See Randall, supra note 61, at 30–31 (contrasting these three main views of
constitutional war powers during the Civil War period).
64. See infra section II.A.
65. Daniel Webster, Unpublished Speech (Dec. 9, 1814), in The Letters of Daniel
Webster 56, 64 (C.H. Van Tyne ed., Greenwood Press 1st reprt. 1968) (1902).
66. Id. at 63 (“[W]henever the legitimate powers of the Constitution should be so
badly administered as to cease to answer the great ends intended by them, such new powers
may be assumed or usurped, as any existing administration may deem expedient.”).
67. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
68. Id. at 127.
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wit of man than that any of [the Constitution’s] provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.”69 The
dangers of removing certain fixed limits to war powers are, this view
holds, simply too great.
Hughes’s approach, by contrast, placed war powers firmly inside the
Constitution while denying all but a few absolute limits. On the one
hand, he stressed that the government’s war powers flow directly from
the Constitution and, as such, are bound by it: “While we are at war, we
are not in revolution. We are making war as a Nation organized under
the constitution, from which the established national authorities derive
all their powers either in war or in peace.”70 On the other hand, wartime
constitutional bounds should (with some exceptions discussed below71)
not be drawn absolutely. He specifically criticized the majority in Milligan
as too doctrinaire in its line-drawing and insensitive to the particular
circumstances of security emergencies.72
For Hughes, that the power to wage war meant the power to do so
successfully implied that in wartime, constitutional powers—including
delegations of authority from Congress to the President—were to be
interpreted expansively and flexibly. At the same time, constitutional
rights were to be interpreted accommodatingly, so as not to unduly inter-
fere with successful prosecution of the conflict. Together these basic
operations, he underlined in his outline notes, help form the “[g]enius
of our institutions.”73
1. Wartime Powers. — Although the Hughes axiom has clear impli-
cations for interpreting the President’s commander-in-chief powers and
the role of courts in adjudicating war powers questions, Hughes himself
was focused on Congress’s powers. The section of his speech titled
“Power to Wage War Successfully” wraps up his outline of Congress’s war-
time authority, and he draws on constitutional drafting history and The
Federalist Papers to conclude that “plenary power was given to Congress to
wage war.”74 Hughes believed strongly in the need for an energetic
wartime executive, but his main interest was legislative authority.
Hughes’s expansive interpretation of legislative war powers flows
directly from Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause: “The Congress
shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
69. Id. at 121.
70. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 232.
71. See infra section I.A.4 (describing Hughes’s view that the Constitution’s structural
and procedural provisions are inflexible even in wartime).
72. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 245–46.
73. Hughes, Outline, supra note 40, at 2.
74. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 239.
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any Department or Officer thereof.”75 Because, Hughes argued, the
Constitution expressly confers power to wage war—in the form of affir-
mative grants to Congress to declare war and build a military and by
conferring on the President commander-in-chief powers, among other
provisions76—the Necessary and Proper Clause greatly augments those
other powers.77 Hughes echoes Chief Justice Marshall’s foundational
analysis in McCulloch v. Maryland, in which Marshall said that having
given power to the government to, among other things, conduct war, the
Constitution must also have conferred ample means to carry out those
duties effectively.78 Indeed, Hughes’s axiom can be read as a modern
application of Marshall’s broad pronouncement that “[t]he power being
given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can
never be their interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their in-
tention, to clog and embarrass its execution by withholding the most
appropriate means.”79 In autobiographical notes made years later, Hughes
recalled his purpose as “pointing out the breadth of the essential powers”
granted the federal government during wartime—powers that must be
adapted to allow for victorious prosecution of war.80
By rooting these expansive powers in the Necessary and Proper
Clause, in contrast to others who saw them as derived from extraconsti-
tutional principles of sovereignty,81 Hughes put Congress front and center
75. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
76. See id. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; Charles Evans Hughes, Notes on Necessary and
Proper Clause (n.d.) (unpublished document) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), in
CEH Papers, supra note 40.
77. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 239.
78. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407–08, 421 (1819).
79. Id. at 407–08.
80. The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes 188 (David J. Danelski &
Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973) [hereinafter Hughes, Autobiographical Notes].
81. A variant of this contrary view is articulated by Hughes’s contemporary, Justice
Sutherland, who wrote—in dicta—for the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright that “the
investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.” 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Rather,
he argued, “[t]he powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned
in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomi-
tants of nationality.” Id.
Indeed, Justice Sutherland expressed this view multiple times. See, e.g., United States
v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931) (“From its very nature, the war power, when nece-
ssity calls for its exercise, tolerates no qualifications or limitations, unless found in the
Constitution or in applicable principles of international law.”); George Sutherland, The
Constitutional Power and World Affairs 70–91 (1919) (detailing his position that the war
powers, although expressly granted in the Constitution to the national government, would
be vested automatically in the national government by virtue of sovereignty); id. at 96–97
(“The power to declare war includes every subsidiary power necessary to make the
declaration effective. . . . [T]he power to proceed to the last extremity [is] . . . a power
that . . . admits of no limitations . . . except as such as are of a more vital character than
the imperious necessity with which they compete . . . .”).
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and laid a doctrinal foundation for finding strict limits to war powers
only in the most clear and unequivocal textual provisions elsewhere in
the document. “The power of the National Government to carry on war
is explicit and supreme,” he emphasizes, “and the authority thus resides
in Congress to make all laws which are needed for that purpose.”82 In
other words, “to Congress in the event of war is confided the power to
enact whatever legislation is necessary to prosecute the war with vigor
and success,” though Hughes is careful to note that “this power is to be
exercised without impairment of the authority committed to the President
as Commander-in-Chief to direct military operations.”83
Hughes here appears especially influenced by Hamilton’s Federalist
No. 23 and No. 26, which dealt with clothing the government in sufficient
power to protect the nation.84 References to these documents appear
several times in Hughes’s research notes and handwritten outlines of the
speech’s arguments.85 His speech quotes the essays at length for the pro-
position that because threats to national safety are unpredictable and
infinite, powers to combat these threats must not be tightly shackled, as
well as the idea that impractical restraints on effective war-making will
not withstand the political imperatives of security crises.86
2. Wartime Delegation.— For Hughes, expansive war powers were also
to be allocated flexibly between the branches. In particular, restrictions
on congressional delegation of policymaking authority and discretion to
the President—which at the time were understood much more strictly
than they are today—were to be relaxed. After discussing the President’s
power to command military campaigns, Hughes remarks that the “power
exercised by the President in time of war is greatly augmented, outside of
his functions as Commander-in-Chief, through legislation of Congress
increasing his administrative authority.”87
Late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century constitutional orthodoxy
included strict delineation of legislative, executive, and judicial roles.88 A
corollary principle limited Congress’s authority to transfer its own policy-
making functions to the President or his administration.89 This would
82. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 239.
83. Id. at 239–40.
84. The Federalist Nos. 23, 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
85. See Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 239 (quoting
Hamilton’s Federalist Nos. 23, 26); Hughes, Outline, supra note 40, at 1 (noting Hamilton’s
Federalist No. 26).
86. See Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 239.
87. Id. at 240.
88. G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal 97–98 (2000) (“The powers
given to the respective branches of the national government were not to be intermingled.”).
89. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the inte-
grity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution.”); see
also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928) (upholding
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later be known as the “nondelegation doctrine,”90 but prior to World War
I, jurisprudence in this area was scarce.
Hughes was concerned that normal rules limiting legislative delega-
tions to the executive branch might impede effective war waging. During
his earlier term as New York governor, he had wrestled with the proper
role of delegation of industry regulation to commissions,91 and during
his years as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Hughes was pivotal in
developing doctrine aimed at cabining reasonable, expert judgments of
administrative agencies—most notably, regarding railroad rate-setting by
the Interstate Commerce Commission.92 He saw modern warfare as im-
posing new demands on the state that could only be met through vast
administrative delegation:
War demands the highest degree of efficient organization, and
Congress in the nature of things cannot prescribe many impor-
tant details as it legislates for the purpose of meeting the exi-
gencies of war. Never is adaptation of legislation to practical
ends so urgently required, and hence Congress naturally in very
large measure confers upon the President the authority to
ascertain and determine various states of fact to which legisla-
tive measures are addressed.93
This was a temporary progressivism applied to waging war—a short-term
retooling of government that would leverage expertise and administra-
tive efficiency to solve problems based on security imperatives, not special
interest politics.
Hughes generally venerated the role of courts in protecting the con-
stitutional system’s integrity,94 but in his speech, interestingly, it was only
on this one issue—delegation—that he emphasized explicitly the impor-
tance of judicial responsibility.95 “[O]f course,” he was careful to add,
provisions in the Tariff Act that delegated certain rate-making functions to the President,
only after finding that the statute provided clear criteria for setting those rates).
90. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315,
317–28 (2000) (tracing the doctrinal and intellectual history of the nondelegation doctrine).
91. See Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges
in America, 1900–1940, at 35–36 (2014) (noting that while Hughes held “‘the highest
regard for the courts’” he worried that “judicial review would transfer the ultimate respon-
sibility for a regulatory decision from administrators . . . to generalist judges” (quoting
Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (May 3, 1907),
in Addresses of Charles Evan Hughes, 1906–1916, at 185 (2d ed. 1916)).
92. See id. at 36–43.
93. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 240.
94. See Ernst, supra note 91, at 28 (discussing Hughes’s emphasis on courts as guar-
dians of liberty against the administrative state); 2 Pusey, supra note 2, at 692 (“Hughes
felt a special responsibility upon the courts to safeguard this American [constitutional]
heritage.”).
95. 2 Pusey, supra note 2, at 692–93.
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“whether the limits of permissible delegation are in any case over-stepped
always remains a judicial question.”96
Hughes’s wartime constitutional suppleness in entrusting policyma-
king authority to the President contrasts strikingly with his later peace-
time stringency as Chief Justice. In the 1935 Panama Refining Co. case, he
wrote for the Court in striking down part of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA)—a major piece of the New Deal agenda—that dele-
gated powers to regulate the petroleum industry for lack of sufficiently
clear legislative criteria and standards.97 While acknowledging in that
context the need for some flexibility to deal with economic complexities,
Hughes insisted that “the constant recognition of the necessity and vali-
dity of such provisions and the wide range of administrative authority
which has been developed by means of them cannot be allowed to
obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional
system is to be maintained.”98 Later that year in Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, Hughes wrote again for the Court in invalidating other
provisions of NIRA, this time regulating the poultry industry.99 Hughes’s
malleable approach to delegation doctrine in 1917 had, by 1935, shifted
toward its prewar form.
3. Wartime Rights. — With regard to individual rights, Hughes also
pushed for wartime flexibility. His speech focused on property rights and
freedom of contract. This was, after all, still the Lochner era during which
those rights were most salient.100
Referring to the guarantees of personal and property rights in the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Hughes argued that while they are
“[c]learly . . . normally and perfectly adapted to conditions of peace,”
they “do not have the same complete and universal application in time of
war.”101 He rejected—as he did in the wartime powers context—the alter-
native positions that constitutional rights guarantees are simply suspended
during wartime or that they remain rigid in application. Instead, he
posited that those guarantees have some elasticity in wartime, stretching
to meet security exigencies. Because the power to wage war successfully is
not only “absolutely essential to the safety of the Nation” but also “expli-
citly conferred”—by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause combined
96. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 241.
97. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
98. Id. at 421.
99. 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935). Noting that the broad delegation was, in principle,
“utterly consistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress,” Hughes
declared, however, that “Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to
exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or
advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry.” Id. at 537–38.
100. See generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal 47–65 (1998) (discussing
the economic-regulation jurisprudence of the New Deal era).
101. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 243.
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with other war and military provisions in the Constitution102—that power
“is not destroyed or impaired by any later provision of the constitution or
by any one of the amendments.”103 To forestall that, the guarantees in the
Bill of Rights “may all be construed so as to avoid making the consti-
tution self-destructive, so as to preserve the rights of the citizen from
unwarrantable attack, while assuring beyond all hazard the common
defence and the perpetuity of our liberties.”104
Hughes did not discuss any limits to this elasticity of wartime rights
in his 1917 speech; neither do his pre-speech notes shed light on whether
and how he would bound it. Curiously, when Hughes restated two de-
cades later his “power to wage war successfully” axiom while writing for
the Court in a Depression-era mortgage-rate case, he this time added an
important and conspicuous caveat: “But even the war power does not
remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.”105 Even
this subsequent addition Hughes confined, though, to constitutional
rights provisions (as well as grants of power) that “are specific, so particu-
larized as not to admit of construction.”106 In those cases—and the foot-
notes suggest he specifically had in mind at that time Fifth Amendment
rights of due process and just compensation for property takings and
Sixth Amendment trial rights107—he said simply (and perhaps too quickly)
that “no question is presented.”108
Although we do not know whether he yet had it in mind for his 1917
address, Hughes incorporated in that subsequent caveat about wartime
rights some of the absolutism of the formalists’ approach to war powers,
but only for a narrow band of issues. Some very specific rights remain
absolutely fixed even in wartime, whereas other rights—those that are
open to varying interpretations—are presumably as flexible as necessary.
In neither the speech nor his later dicta did Hughes address the possi-
bility that absolute, specific rights might impede successful warfare or
that constitutional concerns limited the elasticity of other rights.
4. A Puzzle: Structural-Process Inflexibility. — Hughes’s later distinction
between specific and textually particularized rights—which remain fixed
even in the context of war—and rights that are open to interpretation—
102. See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text (describing Hughes’s interpre-
tation of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
103. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 248.
104. Id.
105. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
106. Id.
107. In one Blaisdell footnote, Hughes cites the following cases: United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 88 (1921) (Fifth Amendment due process); Hamilton v. Ky.
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 155 (1919) (Fifth Amendment takings); United
States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 627 (1871) (same); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 120–27 (1867) (Sixth Amendment trial rights). Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426 n.5.
108. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426.
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which may not—helps partially answer a puzzle raised by his 1917 formu-
lation of our “fighting constitution”: Why, according to Hughes, do some
constitutional features naturally bend to wartime exigencies while others,
especially constitutional processes related to the structure of government
and exercise of some basic powers, do not? In wartime, government
powers flex. Delegation principles flex. Rights flex. But certain constitu-
tional processes related to government structure never bend. This strictly
construed absolutism has an understated but crucial place in Hughes’s
otherwise accommodationist theory.
This aspect of Hughes’s speech is easy to miss because it appears in a
short section on “Other Provisions of the Constitution—Taxing Power.”109
How to finance the war was initially a hot-button issue.110 The Sixteenth
Amendment, making possible an income tax,111 was only four years old,
and the choice of whether to fund the war through taxes or borrowing
would have large distributional consequences.112 Hughes may therefore
have thought it necessary to speak to the issue.
Having argued throughout most of the speech that the size and
shape of the national government’s power shifts dramatically in wartime,
Hughes then, almost offhandedly, explained in this section:
It is manifest, at once, that the great organs of the National
Government retain and perform their functions as the consti-
tution prescribes. Senators and Representatives are qualified
and chosen as provided in the constitution and the legislative
power vested in the Congress must be exercised in the required
manner.113
Wartime or peacetime, it does not matter; legislation still requires
the same majority bicameralism and presidential signature to become
law. “The President,” Hughes went on, “is still . . . elected in the manner
provided . . . .”114 Even in the midst of war, whether a civil war or a world
war, presidential terms last exactly four years. And, “[t]he judicial power
of the United States continues to be vested,” whether in war or in peace,
“in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress has
109. See Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 241. “Taxation”
is one of the few specific provisions that Hughes scribbled out in what appears to be his
two-page outline of the speech. See Hughes, Outline, supra note 40, at 1.
110. Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 7, at 15–17.
111. U.S. Const. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
112. See Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 7, at 95–106 (“[T]he federal government
would assume increased economic authority . . . . Beyond that, little was certain. How would
war revenues be raised? Would taxes bear more heavily on individuals or corporations?”).
113. See Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 241.
114. Id.
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ordained.”115 The punch line of this weighty discussion of fundamental
constitutional design, however, comes back to taxes: The Constitution
strictly dictates—“a requirement operative in war as well as in peace”—
that taxes be geographically uniform throughout the United States.116
This feature of American wartime constitutionalism—that the inter-
pretations of powers and rights expand or contract but some particular
structural processes never change—is now so deeply embedded and well-
practiced as to seem natural and essential. In the decades before World
War I, however, some theorists questioned how well this structural rigidity
functioned in crises. Writing after observing the American Civil War,
British political essayist Walter Bagehot wrote, by way of comparison:
The American Government calls itself a Government of the
supreme people; but at a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign
power is most needed, you cannot find the supreme people. You
have got a Congress elected for one fixed period, going out
perhaps by fixed instalments, which cannot be accelerated or
retarded—you have a President chosen for a fixed period, and
immovable during that period: all the arrangements are for
stated times. There is no elastic element, everything is rigid,
specified, dated. Come what may, you can quicken nothing, and
can retard nothing. You have bespoken your government in
advance, and whether it suits you or not, whether it works well
or works ill, whether it is what you want or not, by law you must
keep it.117
As a political historian at the turn of the century, then-professor
Woodrow Wilson had raised similar concerns about the rigidity of the
American constitutional system to handle security crises and about the
advantages of Cabinet government over executive–legislative separation:
“[D]ivision of authority and concealment of responsibility are calculated
to subject the government to a very distressing paralysis in moments of
emergency.”118 The difficulty, he advised, “is of a sort to be felt at all
times, in seasons of tranquil rounds of business as well as at moments of
sharp crisis; but in times of sudden exigency it might prove fatal.”119
World War I tested these structural critiques. Soon after the war
began in Europe in July 1914, Britain and France adopted far-reaching
changes to their parliamentary structures and mechanisms of governance
115. Id. at 241–42.
116. Id. at 242.
117. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 79–80 (Cornell Univ. Press 1966) (1867).
118. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics 186
(Dover Publ’ns 2006) (1885).
119. Id. at 283; see also Lindsay Rogers, The Constitutional Difficulties of American
Participation, 112 Contemp. Rev. 32, 32 (1917) [hereinafter Rogers, Constitutional
Difficulties] (“In waging war the United States labours under certain difficulties in addi-
tion to those common to all democracies.”).
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to meet wartime demands.120 In Britain, for instance, the Defence of the
Realm Act (DORA) not only enabled the restriction of certain civil li-
berties,121 but it also elevated the role of the cabinet and subordinated
Parliament.122 British government authority became more centralized as
a result, and wartime legislative changes proposed by the cabinet raced
through Parliament unamended almost instantaneously.123
Nothing of the sort happened in the United States. “In the United
States the rigidity of a written Constitution, maintained during the war,”
insisted the distinguished American legal scholar and commentator
Lindsay Rogers in 1919, “prevents political rearrangements so far-
reaching” as Britain’s formal adjustments to separation of powers.124 As a
wartime President, Woodrow Wilson wielded considerable sway over
Congress by virtue of his political influence and appeals to public patrio-
tism.125 Wilson also took an expansive view of his inherent presidential
120. See generally Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship 91–116, 135–70 (1948)
[hereinafter Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship].
121. Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914, 5 Geo. 5 c. 8, § 1(c) (Eng.) (en-
abling the cabinet to issue regulations designed “to prevent the spread of false reports or
reports likely to cause disaffection”). Through this and other sections of the Act, the
cabinet limited free speech, conducted searches and seizures without warrants, and imposed
curfew. See Beckett, supra note 37, at 245–48, 272 (describing the variety of state inter-
vention undertaken via DORA).
122. See Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, supra note 120, at 154.
123. Id. at 156; see also Beckett, supra note 37, at 245–48 (“The House of Commons
gave up its right to scrutinise naval and military estimates and [Prime Minister] Asquith
made no statement on the progress of the war in the House until March 1915.”).
124. Lindsay Rogers, Presidential Dictatorship in the United States, 231 Q. Rev. 127,
127 (1919) [hereinafter Rogers, Presidential Dictatorship]. Rogers was one of a group of
scholars during this era who thought about crisis government, trying to answer the ques-
tion of whether democracies or dictatorships were more effective in crises. See generally
Richard C. Clark, Presidential Emergency Powers: The Contribution of Lindsay Rogers, 20
Presidential Stud. Q. 13, 15–29 (1990) (summarizing Rogers’s arguments and conclusions
“on the problem of emergency powers in a democracy”); Lindsay Rogers, Making a
Democratic Government Effective in Crisis, 19 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 66 passim (1941) (con-
trasting the use of executive war powers in the United States and United Kingdom during
World War I); see also Walter LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy:
An Interpretation, 74 J. Am. Hist. 695, 709 (1987) (“[P]erhaps nothing more discredited
the role of democracies, representative assemblies, and constitutional restraints on foreign
policy than the world war itself.”).
In 1918, some opposition members of Congress pushed a War Cabinet bill that would
have granted power over management of the war to a trio of three distinguished citizens.
This bill drew constitutional objections for, among other things, interfering with the
President’s commander-in-chief powers and was soundly defeated. See James Miller Leake,
The Conflict over Coordination, 12 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 365, 370–73 (1918) (discussing
constitutional objections to the War Cabinet bill); see also Editorial, Vicious and
Unconstitutional, N.Y. World, Feb. 5, 1918, at 6 (quoting Hughes’s war powers speech in
criticizing the War Cabinet bill as unconstitutional).
125. See Rogers, Presidential Dictatorship, supra note 124, at 131–32 (discussing the
passage of the Selective Draft Act as an example of how the war “naturally gave the presi-
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authority, so he began exercising some wartime economic powers and
organizing executive branch administrative boards and commissions even
before Congress authorized him to do so.126 Still, in the period leading
up to Hughes’s speech, Congress took about a month to debate and pass
versions of the emergency Food and Fuel Control Act and the Selective
Service Act,127 both of which are discussed below.128 This was certainly fast
by peacetime legislation standards, but slow compared to the British and
French wartime parliamentary systems.129 Whatever expanded authority
Congress had to enact them, these laws had to work their way through
long-established legislative processes in each house.
As with certain rights but not others, Hughes credits the inflexibility
of American constitutional structures mostly to certain pieces of unam-
biguous text: “[A]part from the provisions fixing the framework of the
Government, there are limitations which by reason of their express terms
or by necessary implication must be regarded as applicable as well in war
as in peace.”130 As a lawyerly distinction, the emphasis on textual clarity
versus ambiguity holds some appeal, but it is not a very satisfying justifica-
tion of this important feature of our “fighting constitution.” Hughes jumps
dential office a prestige and a chance of leadership far greater than when only domestic
issues were to the fore”).
126. See Harold H. Bruff, Untrodden Ground: How Presidents Interpret the
Constitution 213–14 (2015) (noting that prior to the U.S. entry into the war, Wilson “issued
an executive order to arm . . . [U.S. merchant] ships, having been advised by the attorney
general that he had constitutional power to do so without legislation”); Edward S. Corwin,
The President: Office and Powers 1787–1957, at 237 (4th rev. ed. 1957) (arguing that in
addition to other actions, Wilson’s “creation of the Committee on Public Information, the
War Industries Board, and a War Labor Board rested exclusively on this basis [of presi-
dential prerogative]”); William Franklin Willoughby, Government Organization in War
Time and After: A Survey of the Federal Civil Agencies Created for the Prosecution of the
War 70–74, 223–25 (1919) (describing the creation, via executive order, of wartime
agencies focused on industrial and labor issues).
127. See Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 7, at 123, 147–50.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 161, 214; see also Rogers, Constitutional
Difficulties, supra note 119, at 33 (discussing delays); Rogers, Presidential Dictatorship,
supra note 124, at 133 (same).
129. See Rogers, Presidential Dictatorship, supra note 124, at 132–33 (comparing
legislative efficiency).
130. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 242. Just as he
repeats his war powers axiom in Blaisdell, he repeats these limits:
When the provisions of the Constitution, in grant or restriction, are
specific, so particularized as not to admit of construction, no question is
presented. Thus, emergency would not permit a State to have more than
two Senators in the Congress, or permit the election of President by a
general popular vote without regard to the number of electors to which
the States are respectively entitled, or permit the States to “coin money”
or to “make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of
debts.”
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10).
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occasionally between pragmatic purposivism, which he defends through-
out much of the speech with appeals to history and political theory, and
textual formalism.131
In the previous section of the speech Hughes had stressed the need
for adaptation of nondelegation principles to allow for a “vast increase of
administrative authority through legislative action springing from the
necessities of war.”132 So why not also allow for adaptation of textually
precise constitutional structures (or, for that matter, rights)? Perhaps
Hughes regarded administrative delegations, passed through regular
legislative mechanisms, as sufficient to meet wartime necessities without
any adjustment to constitutional structures. Perhaps Hughes regarded
the rigidity of constitutional structures as a strength rather than a weak-
ness to wartime democratic decisionmaking; procedural consistency could,
for instance, be a stabilizing virtue during the most pressurized political
moments. Or, perhaps Hughes believed that the Framers had wisely iden-
tified certain structures, like certain rights, that were so essential to repre-
sentative democracy that they should be protected with unambiguous
text from adjustment in crises. Given Hughes’s aim to show the “[g]enius
of our institutions,”133 however, this composite of adaptive flexibility of
some constitutional features and unyielding rigidity of others points to a
peculiarity of American war powers—a peculiarity for which particular
provisions’ textual clarity, standing alone, is a shaky normative account.
B. A “Marching” Constitution
If the constitutional power to wage war is the power to do so
effectively—to win the wars the country engages in—then this power
necessarily evolves, because warfare itself evolves. Hughes is quite clear
that his general theory of the Constitution includes the need to adjust to
changing circumstances: “[T]here are constantly new applications of un-
changed powers, and it is ascertained that in novel and complex situations,
the old grants contain, in their general words and true significance,
needed and adequate authority.”134 Poetically, the fighting Constitution
“marches.”135 For war powers in particular, the scope and pliability of
authority must accommodate changes in military technology, changes in
the nature of warfare itself, and the advancing security needs of the
nation.
131. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency,
40 Ga. L. Rev. 699, 728–30 (2006) (critiquing Hughes’s reliance on this distinction in
Blaisdell).
132. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 241.
133. See Hughes, Outline, supra note 40, at 2.
134. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 248.
135. Id.
2017] THE POWER TO WAGE WAR SUCCESSFULLY 639
With the exception of textually specific constitutional structures,
Hughes appears to embrace a rather frictionless adjustment of wartime
constitutional machinery.136 That efficiency, however, is in some tension
with the early history and particular features of the Constitution.
While it may be true that the Framers endowed the United States as
a whole with the necessary powers of self-preservation, it is also certainly
the case that they originally settled on compromises that were—by design
—quite inefficient with regard to waging war. Military command is cen-
tralized in the President, as commander in chief, to avoid confusion and
the sort of burdensome command-by-congressional-committee that char-
acterized the Revolutionary War:
It was not in the contemplation of the constitution that the
command of forces and the conduct of campaigns should be in
charge of a council or that as to this there should be division of
authority or responsibility. The prosecution of war demands in
the highest degree the promptness, directness and unity of
action in military operations which alone can proceed from the
Executive.137
Unity of command is efficient. At the same time, however, the consti-
tutional powers of the purse are limited with regards to the military; army
appropriations can be made for up to only two years.138 The Constitution
also divides military power between the federal army and navy and the
state militias, reserving for state governments the authority to appoint
militia officers and train militia forces and limiting the purposes to which
militia forces could be put when called upon by Congress to serve the
federal government.139 No Framer would defend these restrictions and
apportionments as smoothly efficient.140
Such design compromises were necessary because many Framers
and political leaders during the Founding era associated potent military
forces with militarism, and they worried that strong military power—and
especially standing armies—would naturally be put to use.141 Those com-
136. See supra sections I.A.1–.3 (discussing wartime flexibility of government powers,
congressional delegation, and individual rights). Hughes’s very phrase “[our] fighting
constitution” evokes these qualities. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra
note 4, at 248.
137. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 233.
138. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
139. Id. § 8, cls. 15–16.
140. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations 167–69 (4th prtg. 1967) (discussing military inefficiencies built into
the Constitution).
141. See id. (discussing the Framers’ widespread association of standing armies with
militarism); Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the
Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802, at 73–88 (1975) (noting that because of
Founding-era political concerns about militarism, “[t]he convention never seriously
debated allowing Congress a permanent army”); Allan R. Millett et al., For the Common
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promises also seemed reasonable in light of the early Republic’s strategic
needs and ambitions.
At the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified, the main secu-
rity aims of the United States, besides building and maintaining internal
order and union, were mostly confined to defending its territorial
borders and its maritime commerce. 142 The war power thus largely
comprised three basic elements. First, there was the need to field a
modest military force, which generally required recruiting and paying
volunteers, building a navy and enlisting private vessels, or, in the case of
repelling invasions, mobilizing state militias. Second, there was the need
to feed and supply those forces, mostly through purchases on the open
market and requisitions pursuant to the law of nations. And, third, there
was the need to command those forces and direct their operations.143
The Constitution clearly addressed each of these three elements: the first
two in Article I’s grants to Congress of the powers to create and equip a
national military force, and the third in Article II’s designation of the
President as commander in chief.144 Whatever implied war powers also
existed, express war powers covered most foreseeable national defense
needs during the early Republic.
Dramatic changes in national defense needs over time called for
expanded government authority and overturned Founding-era compro-
mises about military powers. The Civil War, for example, required novel,
centralized government controls and structures to harness elements of a
fast-industrializing economy—particularly railroads and factories—in
support of a Union Army far larger than the ones created to wage the
United States’ previous military engagements—namely, the 1846 Mexican–
Defense 81–83 (3d ed. 2012) (“The Constitution tried to create a delicate balance in
which the central government received enough power to ‘provide for the common
defense’ and ‘insure domestic tranquility,’ without extinguishing state sovereignty and
individual liberty.” (quoting U.S. Const. pmbl.)); Bernard Donahoe & Marshall Smelser,
The Congressional Power to Raise Armies: The Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions,
1787–1788, 33 Rev. Pol. 202, 202, 207–10 (1971) (discussing Founding-era concerns
regarding militarism). To a much greater extent, the United States–created pacifist consti-
tutions of post–World War II Japan and Germany strictly limit the countries’ capacities to
wage war. See Russell A. Miller, Germany’s Basic Law and the Use of Force, 17 Ind. J.
Global Legal Stud. 197, 199–200 (2010) (discussing Germany’s pacifist constitution);
D.McN., Keeping the Peace, Economist: Banyan (May 14, 2014), http://www.economist.
com/blogs/banyan/2014/05/japans-pacifist-constitution [http://perma.cc/W4V9-DXQH]
(discussing Japan’s pacifist constitution).
142. See Herring, supra note 3, at 56–59 (highlighting early U.S. foreign relations
priorities, including neutrality and territorial defense).
143. See Edward S. Corwin, Our Constitutional Revolution and How to Round It Out,
19 Pa. B. Ass’n Q. 261, 264 (1948) [hereinafter Corwin, Our Constitutional Revolution].
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–15; id. art. II, § 2.
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American War or the War of 1812.145 The United States’ aims in the Civil
War—to preserve the Union from secession and, later, to combat slavery146
—also publicly cast strong, centralized defense powers as a vital check
against liberty deprivation by states, rather than the other way around.147
By the time Hughes spoke of the wartime Constitution, the United
States was experiencing one of the most dramatic transformations of
military power in its history. These transformations are evident, as
detailed in the next Part, in Hughes’s application of general theory to
the specific circumstances of World War I.
II. OUR “FIGHTING CONSTITUTION” IN THE FIRSTWORLDWAR
Having established a general framework of wartime powers, Hughes
then explains how his “fighting constitution” principles effectively
matched two new features of American warfare: U.S. participation in
World War I was industrial, and it was expeditionary.
When the United States entered the war in 1917, the two European
sides had been bleeding each other nearly to death for three years.148 At
that time, “the suffering and war-weariness of all the major belligerents
greatly increased while the terrible campaigns of attrition seemed to
bring decisive victory no nearer to either combination of powers.”149
Breaking that battlefield stalemate required mobilizing, training, equip-
ping, feeding, and supplying a massive army operating abroad. Not only
would the domestic economy need to support these efforts, possibly for
years, but it would also need to do so having been deprived of a signi-
ficant percentage of its workforce. Some of these challenges, as alluded
to above, existed on a smaller scale during the Civil War.150 This war effort
would be industrial in magnitude and in nature, mass-producing all the
elements of a modern fighting force and mobilizing the entire national
economic system behind it. In his address to Congress requesting a war
declaration, President Wilson emphasized that this step would require
not just massive increases to the size of the military, but “the organization
145. See Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State
Authority in America, 1859–1877, at 94–237 (1990) (outlining war mobilization and state
formation in the Union and Confederacy during the Civil War).
146. See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 494–96 (1988).
147. See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution 380 (2005) (arguing that, because
“states could be just as tyrannical” as Americans feared the federal government could be, a
strong central government could alleviate such tyranny); Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand,
Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict During the Mexican–American War 171 (2002)
(“The blue [U.S. Army] uniform had been a badge of shame for Mexican War volunteers;
it quickly became an honorable symbol of national service in the Civil War.”).
148. See Keegan, supra note 7, at 401–03.
149. Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870–1970, at 121 (1983).
150. See Bensel, supra note 145, at 94–96 (describing the mobilization problems faced
by both the Union and Confederacy).
642 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:613
and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply
the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation.”151
When it entered the war in 1917, the United States had only a few
hundred thousand troops at its disposal, many of them national guards-
men posted on the Mexican border.152 While this placed it well behind
the major European powers militarily, the United States was outprodu-
cing them economically—in most cases by significant margins.153 Within
eighteen months of declaring war, the U.S. military had grown about
twentyfold.154 The U.S. government put around 4.8 million men in uni-
form, which meant dislocating a substantial share of the total population—
including many of the most able-bodied-men—from the civilian economy.155
Its military draft was therefore a “selective service,” an industrial system
designed to keep certain men—such as miners and factory workers—in
jobs that were critical to the war effort.156 As historian David Kennedy
explains, World War I conscription “was to serve primarily as a way to keep
the right men in the right jobs at home.”157
The great oceanic moat separating the United States from Europe
was both a blessing and a curse. While offering protection from many of
the war’s ravages, it also posed an obstacle to deploying and equipping the
massive new army to wage war thousands of miles away.158 True, American
151. Wilson, Declaration of War Against Germany, supra note 48. Congress’s resulting
war declaration also pledged “all of the resources of the country” to the war effort. Act of
Apr. 6, 1917, S.J. Res. 1, 65th Cong.(enacted).
152. Precise figures vary on this point. Compare Leonard P. Ayres, The War with
Germany: A Statistical Summary 16 (2d ed. 1919) (“When war was declared there were
only 200,000 in the Army. Two-thirds of these were Regulars and one-third National
Guardsmen who had been called to Federal service for duty along the Mexican border.”),
with Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America 9 (2001)
(providing an April 1917 total force of about 290,000 including both regular army and
National Guard), Millett et al., supra note 141, at 312 (“In April 1917, the regular Army
numbered 133,111, reinforced by another 185,000 National Guardsmen.”), and Robert H.
Zieger, America’s Great War: World War I and the American Experience 86 (2001)
(describing the June 1917 army as totaling 220,000 troops).
153. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 198–203, 242–49 (1989).
154. Cf. Keegan, supra note 7, at 401–02 (noting that while the U.S. Army contained
about 107,000 men at the beginning of 1917, it grew to 1.3 million by August and ulti-
mately reached over 2.8 million draftees, and that by the end of the war, U.S. ground
forces as a whole totaled over 4 million).
155. See Millett et al., supra note 141, at 315.
156. See John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army 125–26 (1987) (describing
the selective service system during World War I as designed to raise a large army while
preserving civilian manpower and skilled labor); Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 7, at
147–48 (same).
157. Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 7, at 148.
158. See Millett et al., supra note 141, at 318 (discussing challenges of transporting
army to Europe); see also id. at 391 (quoting Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s message
to President Franklin Roosevelt at the beginning of World War II: “‘The oceans, which
were your shield, threaten to become your cage’”).
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forces had been sent abroad many times before; in just the previous two
decades, American soldiers had battled Spanish forces and their allies in
Cuba and the Philippines, helped put down the Boxer Rebellion in China,
and launched cross-border incursions into Mexico.159 Those were, how-
ever, comparatively small affairs, and even in victory the Spanish–American
War had revealed that existing U.S. military forces were poorly trained
and organized.160 To meet the strategic demands of twentieth century
“total” warfare, constitutional law would take several turns defended by
Hughes.
A. Over There: The National Draft and Expeditionary War Powers
The first significant legal controversy of World War I that Hughes
addresses in his speech, and the one he spends the most time discussing,
is conscription. Congress had legislated a national draft a month after
the U.S. entry into the war.161 Did the national government have the
power to compel military service in the expeditionary forces Wilson was
sending to European battlefields?
This was an emotional issue for Hughes. In the six weeks leading up
to the speech, he had devoted a significant amount of his time to his
work as chairman of the New York City District Draft Appeals Board,
reviewing petitions for draft exemptions submitted by city draftees.162 By
late August, the board was deciding nearly 200 cases a day,163 and later
that daily rate rose to closer to a thousand.164 Aware that he was sending
young men to risk their lives overseas, Hughes insisted on personally
signing each appellant’s papers.165 The day before his “fighting constitu-
tion” speech, he stood alongside former President Theodore Roosevelt
and others in front of the New York Public Library to watch recently
159. See Herring, supra note 3, at 314–24, 332–33; Schlesinger, supra note 44, at 91–
92 (describing Wilson’s 1914 unilateral dispatch of “troops to protect American citizens
against the Huerta regime in Mexico”).
160. See Millett et al., supra note 141, at 257–59, 268–71.
161. Selective Service Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76.
162. Pusey, supra note 2, at 370. The draft was a hybrid of national and local
organization.
The organization of the draft diffused resistance and hostility
toward the national government and applied the full majesty of the local
community . . . to make the draft work. At the national level the War
Department administered the draft through the Office of the Provost
Marshal General . . . . [But that office] did not select or exempt indi-
viduals. Supervised by state officials and district boards, the actual task of
inducting draftees rested with the members of some 4,600 local boards.
Millett et al., supra note 141, at 313.
163. Hughes Board Speeds Up; Decides 178 Cases in Day, N.Y. Trib., Aug. 21, 1917, at 6.
164. Pusey, supra note 2, at 371.
165. Id.
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drafted soldiers march up Fifth Avenue.166 Many of those on parade likely
had only weeks earlier received rejection letters bearing Hughes’s
signature to their draft appeals.
1. Constitutional Powers of Conscription.— Whether the federal govern-
ment can institute a national draft seems today like an easy constitutional
question, given Congress’s broad Article I powers to “raise and support
armies.”167 But historically the constitutionality of a national draft was not
at all clear.168 The issue would be settled affirmatively by the Supreme
Court a year after Hughes spoke, in the 1918 Selective Draft Law Cases.169
The oral arguments in that case were marked by patriotic intensity along
the bench, and the decision was unanimous.170 In prior eras, however,
that decision might very well have come out differently, or at least
divided, but for changes in military power and its exercise abroad by the
United States.
At the time Hughes spoke, some constitutional arguments against a
national draft were based on individual rights. Most prominently, draft
opponents contended that conscription was a form of slavery or “invol-
untary servitude” contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment, or that it would
violate the religious beliefs of conscientious objectors contrary to the
First Amendment.171 But debate about the constitutionality of a national
draft long predated the abolition of slavery, and forms of local conscrip-
tion had been practiced in America since colonial times.172 Hughes
quickly dismisses these First and Thirteenth Amendment arguments.173
Historically, the most potent constitutional objection to national
conscription was not about individual rights at all. It was, rather, a struc-
tural argument about federalism.174
Many national draft opponents viewed the issue in terms of federal
powers versus those of the states: Involuntary conscription, the argument
166. City to Review Draft Army in March To-day, N.Y. Trib., Sept. 4, 1917, at 1.
167. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
168. See infra notes 179–184 and accompanying text (describing debates on conscrip-
tion in the War of 1812 and the Civil War).
169. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
170. William H. Harbaugh, Lawyer’s Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis 124–25 (1973).
171. See Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 235–37 (ar-
guing against these two contentions). The main individual rights challenge in the Selective
Draft Law Cases was based on Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude. See Leon
Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67 Mich. L.
Rev. 1493, 1551–52 (1969).
172. See Millett et al., supra note 141, at 3 (“Colonial laws regularly declared that all
able-bodied men between certain ages automatically belonged to the militia.”).
173. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 235–37.
174. See generally Friedman, supra note 171, at 1507–50 (detailing these historical
arguments in the early Republic through the Civil War). But see Webster, supra note 65, at
56–68 (emphasizing individual rights arguments against national conscription during the
War of 1812).
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ran, was an integral aspect of traditional state militia powers protected by
the Constitution’s Militia Clauses—reserving to states the power to main-
tain and train well-regulated militias that could be called into federal
service by Congress for limited purposes175—and, as such, a federal effort
to draft directly the able-bodied population would nullify these state
rights and protections. In other words, an inherent feature of “militias,”
as distinct from regular armies, was mandatory conscription, and the
latter were traditionally raised through voluntary terms of service. Whereas
maintaining the former was the right and responsibility of states, the
federal power to raise and support armies was deliberately limited to
recruiting volunteers or calling forth the militias maintained by the states.
Prior to the U.S. entry into World War I, American debates about military
preparedness therefore showed deep political suspicion of compulsory
military service at the national level. 176 If Congress could conscript
directly, then little might be left of state militias and the traditional
relationship between individual citizens and those state institutions.177
Hughes takes his time in countering this claim. A significant portion
of Hughes’s research notes for the speech is devoted to cases, statutes,
and historical executive action surrounding conscription in the United
States and the Colonies.178 His conclusions reveal how far U.S. military
needs and strategy had evolved during the preceding century and the vast
rebalancing and adjustment of constitutional powers required to meet
them.
Indeed, some of the historical episodes that Hughes invokes to
support a federal conscription power actually show just how constitu-
tionally controversial it had always been. Hughes notes that during the
War of 1812, for instance, Secretary of War James Monroe proposed a
national draft that “was vigorously opposed as unconstitutional.”179 (In-
deed, that proposal was ultimately defeated in Congress.180) Hughes also
quotes at length President Lincoln’s argument from the Civil War that
the Article I power of Congress to “raise and support armies” contains no
restrictions.181 Lincoln’s argument fit nicely with Hughes’s view that con-
175. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16; see also supra text accompanying notes 138–139
(discussing constitutional division of military power between the federal army and the
state militias).
176. See Neiberg, supra note 14, at 131 (“[P]roposals [in 1915] by the army and its
advocates for some form of compulsory military service struck many as unnecessary . . . ,
[whereas] [t]he [state-level] National Guard model . . . had strong backing of state governors
and those fearful of the extension of federal power at the expense of the states.”).
177. See Friedman, supra note 171, at 1541–50 (detailing these arguments, based on
original constitutional compromises, during the War of 1812 and the Civil War).
178. Charles Evans Hughes, Draft Conscription Notes 1–31 (1917) (unpublished
document) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), in CEH Papers, supra note 40.
179. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 234.
180. See Friedman, supra note 171, at 1541–44.
181. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 234–35.
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stitutional powers for waging war must adapt fluidly to meet contem-
porary security challenges and requirements.
Federal conscription during the Civil War was, however, more consti-
tutionally controversial than Hughes let on.182 During that conflict, Chief
Justice Taney went so far as to draft a detailed legal memorandum
arguing that the federal government’s conscription policy was funda-
mentally incompatible with state powers protected by the Constitution,
though Taney did not publish it during the war and no legal challenge
ever reached the Supreme Court for Taney to finalize it as a judicial
opinion.183 True, as Hughes cites, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld
by a 3-2 vote the Union’s national draft, but only a few months earlier
that same court (with a slightly different composition of judges, and
reflecting bitter partisan infighting) had held 3-2 the other way and
temporarily enjoined its state-level enforcement.184
In short, the Civil War had not settled the matter of the constitu-
tionality of conscription. It is no surprise, therefore, that Hughes devotes
so much research and text to this issue.
2. Constitutional Limits on a Conscripted Army. — To some opponents,
the World War I draft was doubly offensive to the Constitution: It obliter-
ated states’ militia powers while it also eviscerated constitutional restric-
tions on the purposes to which conscripted forces could be put.
The Militia Clause limits Congress’s power to call forth state militias
to three specified purposes: “execut[ing] the laws of the union, supp-
ress[ing] insurrections and repel[ling] invasions.”185 These limitations
have their roots in ancient British tradition under which citizens could
be called into military service only locally, not to be sent abroad.186 In
1912, Attorney General George Wickersham provided a memorandum to
the Secretary of War confirming that this clause barred sending the
militia abroad187—a memorandum that Hughes notes approvingly in his
speech. 188 If, as some believed, involuntarily conscripted servicemen
182. Hughes observed that drafts were used to raise armies by the American Colonies
during the Revolutionary War and that both sides nationalized the draft during the Civil
War—a policy whose validity “was sustained by the courts in both North and South.” Id. at
234.
183. See Stephen C. Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War
53–54 (2010) (discussing Chief Justice Taney’s memorandum, which raised a federalism
argument against conscription that “the federal government . . . [is] not authorized to
undermine the state militias by, in effect, poaching their members and putting them
directly into federal service instead”).
184. See Randall, supra note 61, at 11–12 (discussing the famous case of Kneedler v.
Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863)).
185. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
186. Auth. of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322,
323 (1912).
187. Id. at 328–39.
188. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 237.
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were, by definition, constitutionally “militia,” then it would arguably follow
that they could not be sent to fight in Europe.
Perhaps the most vitriolic critic on this point was Hannis Taylor,189
who litigated several cases up to the Supreme Court challenging the World
War I draft.190 A former diplomat, he was anything but diplomatic in his
public criticism.191 In a legal memorandum—submitted into the congres-
sional record in October 1917 by a House member who opposed the
draft—Taylor ripped into the Wilson Administration and Hughes.192 He
called legal arguments defending the federal drafting of citizens for
service abroad “the most indefensible and deadly assault ever made on
the Constitution.”193 Turning his fire directly on Hughes’s recent defense
of conscription in his “fighting constitution” speech, Taylor wrote:
Was there ever such a dreadful spectacle? There stood an
ex-justice of the Supreme Court as the prosecutor of half a
million of American youths, under military duress and on trial
for their lives, with no one to defend them. The idea was that in
that star-chamber proceeding the mere ipse dixit of a great
legal functionary would deprive our sons of the protection
guaranteed by a thousand years of English and American consti-
tutional law.194
But Hughes would say that this argument gets the issue precisely
backwards. The constitutional injunction that state militia may not be
189. In an editorial praising Hughes’s 1917 speech, the New York Times took specific
aim at Taylor, arguing that Hughes’s arguments proved that Taylor’s anticonscription posi-
tion was “contradicted by common sense.” Editorial, War Powers Under the Constitution,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1917, at 8.
190. Besides serving as counsel in Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918), Taylor filed a brief
as amicus curiae in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 368 (1918).
191. Taylor had previously served as U.S. minister to Spain. See Kennedy, Over Here,
supra note 7, at 168 n.66. When Wilson learned of Taylor’s constitutional criticisms, he
asked Attorney General Thomas Gregory if there was “anything we could do to this wretched
creature.” Id.
192. Taylor’s statement is titled “A Petition to the Senate and House of Representatives”
submitted “in behalf of himself and as next friend of the half million and more of
American youths now under military duress.” 55 Cong. Rec. app. 640 (1917) (extension of
remarks of Rep. Gordon). Indeed, Representative Gordon introduces Taylor’s statement
with (negative) reference to Hughes’s famous “fighting constitution” speech, issued a month
prior. Id.
193. Id. at app. 643. He also called them “stupid” and “pitiful” and perpetrated by
“evil-minded” people. Id. at app. 641–42.
194. Id. at app. 643. In litigating unsuccessfully a Supreme Court case challenging the
constitutionality of sending drafted servicemen abroad, Taylor wrote to the Court: “It is
hard to understand why the term ‘brief’ should be applied to a light, flippant and offen-
sive paper” filed by the Solicitor General. Reply to “Brief for the Appellee” at 1, Cox v.
Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918) (No. 833). Indeed, Taylor’s zealousness so surpassed the boun-
daries of professional decorum that the Solicitor General requested that Taylor’s briefs be
stricken from the record. The Court denied that request, but Taylor lost the case 9-0. Cox,
247 U.S. at 6–7.
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sent abroad195 is an argument for, not against, the constitutionality of a
federal draft.
For Hughes, “[t]he power to use an army is co-extensive with the
power to make war.”196 If the government has the power to fight that war
abroad, which it clearly does, then it must have the power to create an
army capable of doing so effectively. And if a modern expeditionary army
of sufficient size and composition can be assembled only by way of selec-
tive conscription, but the state militia system is constitutionally barred
from providing it, then this power must instead be lodged in the federal
government. “[T]he army may be used wherever the war is carried on,
here or elsewhere,” Hughes remarked.197 In conclusion, “[t]here is no
limitation upon the authority of Congress to create an army and it is for
the President as Commander-in-Chief to direct the campaigns of that
army wherever he may think they should be carried on.”198
Note that the Hughes–Taylor debate constitutes, at root, a new
constitutional argument and counterargument raised by an evolution in
American grand strategy, one that entailed sending large armies abroad.
The argument would not arise if national military power were confined
largely to defending U.S. borders.199 Indeed, a constitutional debate
about sending large-scale forces abroad would have been almost acade-
mic for much of American history before the late nineteenth century;200
it was, simply, far from foreign policy thinking during that period.201
195. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16.
196. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 238.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text (describing the early U.S.
national security priority of territorial defense).
200. As Professor Walter LaFeber explains, until the Civil War, U.S. foreign policy inte-
rests “were not to be located on the other side of the globe . . . but across the next river or
mountain range where lands and ports claimed by Indians, Mexicans, Canadians, or
Europeans were coveted.” LaFeber, supra note 124, at 699. Writing during the Second
World War, political commentator Walter Lippmann noted:
Until very recently, and for so long a time that no one living could
remember anything else, . . . [Americans explained their security] by a
popular myth: the Atlantic Ocean was too wide for an enemy to cross
it. . . . The United States did not need measures to provide for its own
security; it needed merely to abstain from becoming involved across the
seas.
Walter Lippmann, U.S. War Aims 197 (1944); see also Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign
Policy: Shield of the Republic 49 (1943) (describing long American history of “unearned
security” provided by oceans).
201. Hughes notes that the United States had sent military troops to foreign soil in,
for example, the War of 1812 (to Canada), the Mexican–American War, the Spanish–
American War, and, more recently, to address crises in China and Mexico. Hughes, War
Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 238.
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From World War I onward, however, the constitutional arguments
had to take cognizance of new strategic thinking. Although during the
interwar decades American politics strongly favored a narrow view of
global American security interests and a restrained view of American
military power to address them, since World War II American strategy has
stressed keeping and using American military power abroad.202 This Article
returns to that strategic transformation—seeing global stability, and U.S.
military underwriting of it, as critical to American national defense—in
Part III, because it revamps what it means constitutionally to “wage war
successfully.”
As it happened, Hughes’s argument won. The Supreme Court upheld
unanimously the World War I draft in a set of challenges grouped as the
Selective Draft Law Cases.203 “The army sphere therefore embraces such
complete authority,” held the Court, and “the duty of exerting the power
thus conferred in all its plenitude . . . was wisely left to depend upon the
discretion of Congress as to the arising of the exigencies which would call
it in part or in whole into play.”204 The fact that the 1918 decision gives
relatively short shrift to some of the historical arguments about protec-
ting states’ rights perhaps suggests that the Court was moved by perceived
immediate necessities of modern warfare—concerns that had displaced
early-Republic faith in state militias as safeguards of constitutional order.205
B. The Home Front: Economic Regulation and Industrial War Powers
After dispensing with the conscription issue, much of the remainder
of Hughes’s speech is dedicated to defending the radically far-reaching
domestic economic regulations needed to successfully wage the war. As
with conscription, the Civil War had involved strategic and legal ante-
cedents on wartime economic regulation, but World War I economic
regulation differed in degree and in kind. In his 1948 book Constitutional
Dictatorship, historian and political scientist Clinton Rossiter later des-
cribed the domestic power Wilson wielded as “infinitely more . . . than
had ever been given to an American President. In absolute terms it far
exceeded Lincoln’s, for it extended to a control of the nation’s economic
life that would have caused a revolution in 1863.”206
At the time of Hughes’s speech in September 1917, Congress had
just begun its program of enacting major wartime economic and admini-
202. See infra section III.C.2 (describing the post–World War II change in grand stra-
tegy as a direct challenge to earlier understandings of constitutional war powers).
203. 245 U.S. 366, 382–83 (1918).
204. Id.
205. At one point, the Court referenced congressional opposition to a national draft
during the War of 1812 but said simply, “[W]e need not stop to consider it,” because it felt
the issues had already been disposed of earlier in the opinion. Id. at 385.
206. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, supra note 120, at 241–42.
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strative acts. Without yet knowing the extent of economic control that
Wilson would soon wield, Hughes confidently offers in general terms a
strong constitutional justification. This involved addressing three main
questions: First, did Congress have the power to impose such expansive
economic controls; second, were such controls consistent with constitu-
tional rights; and, third, could Congress delegate to the President broad
policymaking discretion with regard to that power?
1. Wartime Regulation. — In the decade or so before Hughes’s war-
time address, Congress and the courts had been wrestling with how to
govern an increasingly complex and interconnected modern economy.207
Addressing the New York State Bar Association in his capacity as a
Supreme Court Justice in 1916, Hughes spoke of entering a new era in
American law: “Most notable, I think, is first, the exercise of the power of
Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce and, second, the esta-
blishment in Nation and State of administrative agencies with both
legislative and quasi-judicial powers of vast importance.”208
However these trend lines may have looked in peacetime, the
United States’ entry to the war massively and suddenly accelerated
regulation and administrative control over the national economy.209 The
new era of “total war,” entailing mobilization of entire societies to meet
the needs of fielding and supplying unprecedentedly large armies over
long periods, required expansive government control of industry, labor,
transportation, and information.210 For the Western allies, this included
new governmental structures that sharply broke with classical liberal
philosophy celebrating the role of the individual.211 The American public’s
207. For a useful account of the debates about the growth of the regulatory state in
the early twentieth century, see Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1216–36 (1986).
208. Charles E. Hughes, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Some Aspects of the
Development of American Law 4 (Jan. 14, 1916) (on file with Columbia Law Review).
Hughes went on to present the common justifications for the administrative state—
“special knowledge, flexibility, disinterestedness and sound judgment”—but then cau-
tioned that “mere bureaucracy—narrow, partisan, or inexpert—is grossly injurious.” Id. at
6–7.
209. For a useful overview of mobilization, see Millett et al., supra note 141, at 314–15.
210. See Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution 38 (1947) [hereinafter
Corwin, Total War] (describing the challenge of “adapting legislative power to the needs
of total war”).
211. See Ernst, supra note 91, at 44 (describing the rise of administrative agencies to
facilitate wartime mobilization); see also Beckett, supra note 37, at 245 (describing
Australia’s War Precautions Act and Unlawful Associations Act, which “enabl[ed] the
introduction of censorship, the curtailment of civil liberties, . . . the control of aliens . . .
[and] enabled the [government] to move against groups regarded as subversive . . . .”);
supra notes 120–124 and accompanying text (discussing changes to British and French
governmental structures).
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lives would be dictated in unparalleled ways by a complex set of agencies,
boards, councils, and commissions.212
Prior to Hughes’s speech, Congress had already enacted several far-
reaching laws and committed to the President vast authority to work out
the details as he saw necessary. Most prominently, Congress had in August
1917 passed the Food and Fuel Control Act, or the Lever Act, which
conferred on the President broad powers “to make such regulations and
to issue such orders as are essential”213 to assure adequate and equitable
supply and distribution of those critical resources—that is, essentially to
regulate vast parts of the economy in furtherance of vast objectives.214
Hughes’s understanding of wartime legislative powers provided
ample basis for significant additional regulation to come.215 Prior to the
war, Congress had included, in an army appropriations act, provisions
that authorized the President “to take possession and assume control of
any system or systems of transportation” in times of war, and Wilson exer-
cised this power in December 1917.216 In July 1918, Congress passed a
212. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, supra note 120, at 247. Prior to the war, the
“preparedness” movement had led the creation of various boards designed “to prepare for
integration of government and business in the event of American entry to the war.”
Beckett, supra note 37, at 247. Once the United States joined the war, the Wilson
Administration created myriad executive-branch organizations. Among the most famous
were the General Munitions Board, the War Trade Board, and the War Industries Board,
which sought to guide the process of total economic mobilization in a way that balanced
military need with civilian economic dislocations. See id. at 247–48; see also Millett et al.,
supra note 141, at 316–17.
213. Pub. L. No. 65-41, § 1, 40 Stat. 276, 276 (1917).
214. Corwin, Total War, supra note 210, at 39 (describing Congress’s delegation of
power to the executive in this and other wartime statutes).
Prior to Hughes’s September 1917 speech, Congress had already passed numerous
wartime regulatory statutes. Most famous, of course, were the Selective Service Act, ch. 15,
40 Stat. 76 (1917) and the Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917). In addition, Congress
had passed the First Liberty Bond Act, ch. 4, 40 Stat. 35 (1917) (raising revenue for the
war); the Emergency Shipping Fund Act, ch. 29, 40 Stat. 182 (1917) (authorizing the
creation of an agency to regulate the shipping industry); the Enemy Vessel Confiscation
Joint Resolution, ch. 13, 40 Stat. 75 (1917) (permitting the seizure of ships registered
under an enemy flag or owned by an enemy corporation); the Jones-Shafroth Act, ch. 145,
39 Stat. 951 (1916) (granting U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans, in part for conscription
reasons); and multiple massive military and defense appropriations measures. By the end of
1917, Congress would pass several more measures, including the Trading with the Enemy
Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (prohibiting commerce with enemy governments, cor-
porations, and others); the Aircraft Board Act, ch. 61, 40 Stat. 296 (1917) (creating an
agency to regulate the aircraft industry); the Explosive Act, ch. 83, 40 Stat. 385 (1917)
(regulating the manufacture and distribution of dangerous chemicals and ingredients);
and several revenue-generating bills.
215. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 246–47 (“Reasonable
regulations to safeguard the resources upon which we depend for military success must be
regarded as being within the powers confided to Congress to enable it to prosecute a
successful war.”).
216. Act of August 29, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-242, 39 Stat. 619, 645; see also Presidential
Proclamation, 40 Stat. 1733, 1734 (1917) (invoking that Act to “take possession and assume
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joint resolution authorizing the President to seize control of communi-
cation lines, which the President exercised later that year.217 In addition,
Congress passed the Overman Act in August 1918, which granted the
President wide powers to reorganize the functions of executive agencies
as needed—according to his own assessment—to prosecute the war.218
This reorganization authority bolstered Wilson’s efforts to regulate war
industries and labor pursuant to his own constitutional authority, which
he regarded as abundant.
This legislation was not applied without reservation. For example,
the great federal appeals court judge Charles Hough of New York declared
around the same time of these actions that “[w]hen one turns from laws
for or directly affecting the military” to Congress’s recent wartime econo-
mic control measures, “there appears a kind of governmental effort abso-
lutely new in American history, and concerning which no court has yet
been called on to speak. On the subjects treated we have no social or
political traditions that have not been violated, and few inherited legal
suggestions.”219
But Hughes instead saw these activities as a continuity of long-
standing constitutional principles. As to whether Congress possessed
constitutional authority to enact such far-reaching economic regulation,
this was, for Hughes, Congress exercising the very “power to wage war
successfully” he describes in his speech.220 The Commerce Clause could
not have served effectively as a source of authority, because, at the time,
regulation of most domestic economic activity was regarded as the exclu-
sive province of the states.221 However, as Hughes explains in his speech,
that limited understanding of federal dominion does not hold in war-
control . . . of each and every system of transportation [including railroads] . . . to . . .
utilize[] . . . [such systems] for the transfer and transportation of troops, war material and
equipment, to the exclusion so far as may be necessary of all other traffic thereon”).
217. See infra notes 276–279 and accompanying text. The July 1918 law had roots in
the Civil War, during which Congress had similarly authorized the President to take over
telegraph and railroad lines whenever “in his judgment the public safety may require it.”
See Railroad and Telegraph Seizure Act, ch. 15, 12 Stat. 334 (1862).
218. Overman Act, ch. 78, 40 Stat. 556 (1918).
219. Charles M. Hough, Law in War Time—1917, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 699 (1918).
220. Hughes was not the only one to conceive of these statutes in this way. For
example, during congressional deliberations of the Food and Fuel Control Act, see supra
note 127 and accompanying text, supporters in Congress and the executive branch made
similar claims about the breadth of war powers. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 65-75, at 1 (1917)
(describing the bill as a “war emergency measure”); 55 Cong. Rec. 3822, 3822–24 (1917)
(memorandum of Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture Francis G. Caffey) (descri-
bing the bill as a “war measure”); 55 Cong. Rec. 3809, 3809–10 (1917) (statement of Rep.
Anderson) (demonstrating a “direct and conclusive relation between the prosecution of
the war . . . and food regulation and control”).
221. See, e.g., May, supra note 62, at 15–16 (describing the limited contemporary
understanding of congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce).
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time; rather Congress “is confided the power to enact whatever legislation
is necessary to prosecute the war with vigor and success.”222
Hughes’s confidence in making these bold pronouncements must
have been buttressed by his observations of the European wartime ex-
perience. He had paid especially close attention to events across the
Atlantic,223 especially when resolute military preparedness became a major
issue for him in the 1916 presidential campaign.224 The European anta-
gonists had gone to war in 1914 self-assured of a short affair. The three
years of European conflict before American entry had exposed their
tragic mistakes in failing to prepare and organize their economies suffi-
ciently to meet the demands of protracted war at modern scale and
intensity.225 That experience empirically validated claims of sweeping
wartime economic powers as necessary.
2. Wartime Rights. — Whether Congress had the power to regulate
economic affairs so extensively was, in addition to a question of powers, a
question of rights. So it was on this issue that Hughes brought to bear his
elastic understanding of the Bill of Rights in wartime.
Substantive due process rights of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments were generally understood during that period to bar,
respectively, federal and state regulation of “private” activities. Businesses
and activities that were not “affected with the public interest” were largely
protected from government interference or control.226 Because there was
relatively little federal regulation before World War I (due to the narrow
construction of the Commerce Clause), most of the pre-War constitu-
tional jurisprudence arose out of states’ exercise of their police powers.
During this period, the Supreme Court wrestled with where to draw the
line between private activities and those “affected with the public in-
terest”—and therefore the outer boundary of government regulation.227
Here Hughes draws on the idea that rights must bend to meet the
demands of modern warfare: “We are witnessing a new phase of the
exercise of war powers. But the applicable principle to determine the
222. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 239–40.
223. See Pusey, supra note 2, at 368–70 (describing Hughes’s reaction to Germany’s
war efforts as “an onslaught on liberty and on civilization itself”).
224. See id. at 353–59 (describing Hughes’s pro-preparedness platform).
225. See Rogers, Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 119, at 32, 35–37 (describing
how the “European experience has forced on us the conviction that various autocratic laws
are necessary and proper if a democracy is to prosecute a war successfully”). Rogers wrote
that the European experience proved the necessity of unprecedented wartime economic
regulation, but he expressed doubt as to how far the law would stretch. See id. at 36–38.
226. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130–32 (1876) (upholding state price-fixing for
grain elevators because they were found to be businesses “affected with a public interest”).
227. See generally Cushman, supra note 100, at 47–65 (discussing how the distinction
between “public and private spheres” affected economic regulation jurisprudence of that
era).
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validity of such action is not new.”228 Addressing whether modern warfare
could dramatically expand understandings of what it meant for
otherwise-private activities to be “affected with the public interest,” Hughes
cites German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis.229 That 1914 case upheld a
state statute setting fire insurance rates. In holding that the regulated
business had “by circumstances and its nature, . . . rise[n] from private to
be of public concern and [was] subject, in consequence, to governmental
regulation,”230 the Court noted that as the economy evolved, the line
between private and public interests would shift—and with it, the
contours of permissible regulation.
Hughes extends this analysis to argue that “[t]he extraordinary
circumstances of war may bring” certain industries, businesses, and other
private activities within the scope of regulatory power, and Congress had
powers to reasonably control and manage resources “to enable it to
prosecute a successful war.”231 With the recently enacted and sweeping
Food and Fuel Control Act clearly in mind, for example, Hughes states:
“The production and distribution of foodstuffs, articles of prime nece-
ssity, those which have direct relation to military efficiency, those which
are absolutely required for the support of the people during the stress of
conflict, are plainly of this sort.”232
Hughes does not say a word about the First Amendment or free
expression in the address. The lack of any discussion by Hughes is striking
given that the 1917 Espionage Act had been enacted several months
earlier after considerable debate and constitutional controversy regarding
some provisions proposed by Wilson.233 This omission seems especially
228. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 246–47.
229. Id. at 247 (citing 233 U.S. 389 (1914)).
230. German Alliance, 233 U.S. at 411.
231. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 247.
232. Id. For a contemporary view less sanguine about the constitutionality of such
regulation, see Rogers, Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 119, at 36–37 (“Not so clear,
however, is the extent to which Congress may go in regulating the food supply . . . . [I]t
would be impossible to make any definite prediction regarding the constitutional
question . . . . [T]here would be very serious doubts as to the federal right.”).
233. See Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 7, at 24–26 (discussing debates about the
Espionage Act); Rogers, Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 119, at 38–40 (discussing
the controversy around the Espionage Act). Later statements by Hughes suggest that he
was not much bothered by wartime restrictions on dissent and that he applied his flexible
approach to rights in wartime to the First Amendment. In a 1919 address, for example, he
stated: “In speech . . . we have had unwonted restraints to which we have submitted in
order to win the victory,—not to enthrone military rule, but to destroy the rule of force
and to make freedom permanent.” Charles E. Hughes, President, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, The
Republic After the War (Jan. 17, 1919) [hereinafter Hughes, Republic After the War], in
New York State Bar Association: Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Meeting 224, 233
(The Argus Co. 1919). He continued: “The war has stifled criticism, subordinated indi-
vidual initiative to public control, and centered power in small and irresponsible groups.
We have welcomed all these methods that the cause might triumph.” Id. A 1918 editorial
quotes Hughes as saying in a speech:
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glaring in retrospect because World War I is often associated today with
restrictions on free speech and press.234 But at that time there was still
“scant judicial precedent on the meaning of the First Amendment”235
and the public was more worried about disloyalty than freedom of dis-
sent.236 It was not until a few years later that World War I efforts to
suppress antiwar speech and publications sparked high-profile Supreme
Court litigation and free-expression progressivism.237
3. Wartime Delegation. — Nobody thought that Congress itself had
the necessary expertise and agility to set and continually update the
intricate rules and details of a vast new regulatory administration. These
tasks would have to be delegated to experts in executive-branch agencies.
However, under prevailing peacetime constitutional thought (cases were
rare in the nascent administrative state, so “jurisprudence” would be an
overstatement238), many of the major wartime statutes would normally
have been regarded as impermissible transfers of policymaking respon-
sibility from the Congress to the President.239
I believe in freedom of criticism, but every one who criticizes
should apply to his criticism the acid test of whether it helps to the
vigorous prosecution of the war or retards it. If it helps, then the more
of that criticism we have the better. If it embarrasses, then we want none
of it and the American people won’t stand it.
Editorial, The Test of Criticism, N.Y. World, Feb. 7, 1918, at 6.
After the war, Hughes would gain a reputation as a strong guardian of free expression
for defending a group of socialists from expulsion from the New York legislature. See
Pusey, supra note 2, at 391–93.
234. See Bruff, supra note 126, at 218–22 (noting that the Wilson Administration—
with help from “prosecutors, judges, and juries”—“aggressively stifled dissent” to “sup-
press disloyalty,” which resulted in, inter alia, “over two thousand” prosecutions under the
Espionage Act and Sedition Act); Rabban, supra note 41, at 255–69 (detailing lower court
Espionage Act litigation); William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in
Wartime 170–83 (1998); supra note 41 and accompanying text (introducing the significant
restrictions on civil liberties during World War I).
235. Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act
of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 159 (2004).
236. See id. at 182; see also Rabban, supra note 41, at 2 (contrasting prewar “pervasive
judicial hostility to virtually all free speech claims” with “a comprehensive defense by
libertarian radicals of broad protection for almost every expression”).
237. See Stone, supra note 235, at 138.
238. Prior to World War I, there was scant judicial precedent on the delegation
question. Two notable exceptions were United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516–17
(1911) (upholding a statute delegating to the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to
establish regulations, including criminal penalties, regarding the use of public forest reser-
vations), and Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 696–97 (1892) (upholding a statute delegating
to the President the authority to alter tariffs upon the congressionally imposed condition
of finding of unfair treatment to American businesses).
239. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (outlining the peacetime nonde-
legation doctrine, which forbade the blending of executive, judicial, and legislative powers).
However, Westel Willoughby—whose treatise Hughes relied upon in crafting his 1917
speech—interestingly seemed to endorse at least some wartime delegation on functional
656 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:613
To that anticipated charge Hughes argues that “[t]he principles
governing the delegation of legislative power are clear, and while they are
of the utmost importance when properly applied, they are not such as to
make the appropriate exercise of legislative power impracticable.”240
Furthermore, whereas in peacetime:
Congress cannot be permitted to abandon to others its proper
legislative functions; . . . in time of war when legislation must be
adapted to many situations of the utmost complexity, which
must be dealt with effectively and promptly, there is special
need for flexibility and for every resource of practicality . . . .241
While wartime economic powers expanded and individual rights
narrowed, nondelegation restrictions eased. As a result, Hughes concludes,
“We thus not only find these great war powers conferred upon the
Congress and the President, respectively, but also a vast increase of
administrative authority through legislative action springing from the
necessities of war.”242
At the time Hughes spoke, the sweeping bureaucratic apparatus was
still being designed and constructed, and it would quickly be accepted
politically—and legally—in just such terms of necessity.243 In Rossiter’s
depiction, the American citizen “was most conscious of the war . . . by the
migration of private citizens to Washington and the erection there of a
complexity of boards, commissions, and agencies to control his economic
life.”244
* * *
In November 1918, about a year and a half after the United States
entered the war, the Allies and an utterly defeated Germany reached an
armistice, or ceasefire truce.245 In the short span between Congress’s April
1917 war declaration and the armistice—during which Germany, freed
from fighting in the East after Russia’s withdrawal from the war, threw its
grounds. Willoughby, Constitutional Law, supra note 32, at 1208 (“With respect to many
matters of detail Congress has delegated to the President . . . the establishment of admini-
strative orders for the government of the land and naval forces which it might consti-
tutionally itself provide, but which . . . it is either impossible or unwise for it to attempt to
do so.”).
240. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 241.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See generally Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 7, at 93–143 (discussing the
political economy of the home front as the wartime bureaucracy was established).
244. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, supra note 120, at 247.
245. Armistice with Germany, Nov. 11, 1918, 2 U.S.T. 9, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/
us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0009.pdf [http://perma.cc/R78V-WBG4]; see also Keegan,
supra note 7, at 444–50 (detailing Germany’s military defeat).
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full military weight to the Western Front246—the United States converted
its immense economic resources and energy into a formidable military
force.
In the end, the Supreme Court validated Hughes’s views on wartime
economic regulation and administration. Despite plenty of challenges
and opportunities for judicial repudiation, no significant wartime eco-
nomic regulation was struck down as beyond Congress’s powers, as an
unconstitutional delegation, or as violating constitutional economic or
contractual rights.247
When considered together, this marked the most significant
development in American war powers to date. True, immediately after
the Civil War the Supreme Court upheld significant wartime economic
measures, notably the 1862 Legal Tender Act,248 in which Congress, for
the first time in the nation’s history, authorized the production of paper
currency—the famous “greenbacks”—unbacked by hard coin.249 Empha-
sizing the centrality of the emergency of the Civil War in its analysis and
invoking the seminal McCulloch decision, the Court held the Act to be a
valid exercise of Congress’s Article I authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.250
246. See, e.g., Keegan, supra note 7, at 358–69 (describing the Russian Revolution as
permitting Germany to “transfer[] the best of its eastern army to the Western Front, in
preparation for what it planned to be the war-winning offensives against the French and
British”).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1926)
(upholding actions under the Trading with the Enemy Act, including delegation to the
President to determine the terms of sale of enemy properties in light of conditions arising
in the war); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 86–93 (1921) (striking
down criminal convictions for excessive price fixing under regulations promulgated pur-
suant to the Food Control Act, on the grounds of vagueness, but not calling into question
Congress’s power to authorize regulation of food pricing); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156–61 (1919) (upholding wartime prohibition of liquor
traffic as within Congress’s war powers); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S.
163, 183 (1919) (“That under its war power Congress possessed the right to confer upon
the President the authority [to seize communications networks as necessary to protect
national defense] we think needs nothing here but statement . . . .”); see also Clarence A.
Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States 204 (1921) (citing Hughes, as
validated by World War I precedent, for the proposition that the necessities of total war
extended constitutional powers “to cover practically every enterprise and activity within
the country”).
248. Legal Tender Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345, 345 (1862) (declaring the paper notes
“shall be . . . lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private,
within the United States”).
249. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
250. Id. at 537–40. The Court recognized that Congress, faced with a dire emergency
after the disastrous Union defeat at Bull Run and in the midst of an economic crisis, was
faced with a “necessity . . . immediate and pressing.” Id. at 540. Lest the war effort collapse,
Congress had to provide a means of funding; its choice to issue paper currency was
“appropriate and adapted” to that end. Id. at 541. Additionally, the Court rejected argu-
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But whereas many of Lincoln’s most drastic Civil War measures—
suspension of habeas corpus, a federal draft, slave emancipation—were
proclaimed unilaterally or never received Supreme Court validation, the
most drastic World War I measures were blessed by all three branches of
government.251 Hughes would reflect back, a decade after the war, that
“the Great War . . . furnish[ed] the occasion for decisions of the Supreme
Court sustaining [the war power] in its broadest scope.”252 The alter-
native views that constitutional limits were either suspended altogether
or remained unbendingly fixed in wartime253 were soundly defeated by
Hughes’s adaptive approach.254 Surveying jurisprudential developments
through the Second World War, Rossiter would later conclude that the
Supreme Court has “for the most part . . . agreed with Chief Justice
Hughes’s famous observations that ‘the war power of the Federal
Government . . . is a power to wage war successfully’ and that ‘so, also, we
have a fighting constitution.’”255
This Part has shown how Hughes’s flexible and adaptive interpre-
tation of war power solved one major problem of his day that he keenly
understood: how to mobilize the entire national industrial economy for
expeditionary war. As the following Part explains, however, this solution
opened up another set of problems that Hughes’s war power theory was
unable to close.
III. HUGHES ANDOUR POSTWAR FIGHTING CONSTITUTION
Hughes’s main purpose in the “fighting constitution” speech being
to justify the Wilson Administration’s wartime policies, he stridently
defended an unreservedly muscular conception of constitutional war
powers. But he was also cognizant—and later, after the immediate peril
ments that the Act violated the right to individual freedom of contract and the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause. Id. at 548–52.
251. Cf. Berdahl, supra note 247, at 268 (noting that Wilson was careful to secure
legislative authorization for his actions, unlike Lincoln who “in cases of doubted authority
and even of undoubted lack of authority . . . usually acted first and secured the sanction of
law afterwards, if at all”).
252. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 104 (1928)
[hereinafter Hughes, The Supreme Court].
253. See supra notes 55–69 and accompanying text.
254. As Corwin wrote:
The early quarrel between the theory that the clauses of the Constitution
protective of private rights were suspended by war and the theory that
these clauses remained in full sway in war’s despite was resolved in World
War I in favor of a compromise theory, what I have termed “consti-
tutional relativity” . . . .
Corwin, Total War, supra note 210, at 131 (quoting Hughes, War Powers Under the
Constitution, supra note 4, at 238, 248).
255. Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief, supra note 45, at 7.
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had subsided, outspoken—of the acute dangers of wartime government
power.
For Hughes, the elasticity of the power to wage war successfully was
justified on the assumptions that clear lines exist between wartime and
peacetime and that following successful war there would be a reversion to
constitutional normality.256 War-waging constitutional pliancy would be
only temporary.257 Hughes remarked in an address at Columbia University
less than two weeks after the November 1918 armistice:
The astounding spectacle of centralized control which we have
witnessed has confused many and turned the heads of some.
But this, for the most part, has been the manifestation of the
Republic in arms, fighting as a unit, with powers essential to self-
preservation, which the Constitution not only did not deny but
itself conferred.258
He went on to warn, however, that war could be used pretextually to
advance political and legal agendas and he expected courts to play a
checking role.259
For Hughes, the end of the war meant a retraction to prewar
governmental powers. “[N]ow victory has been won,” Hughes proclaimed
as President of the New York State Bar Association in January 1919, and
therefore “[t]he Republic turns to the methods of peace.”260 That in-
cluded dismantling much of the wartime administrative apparatus.261
Although there might be a need for some gradual adjustment, “[p]eace
256. See Ernst, supra note 91, at 44; Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative
Legitimacy, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 718, 740–41 (2016) (book review). Hughes’s view drew on a
constitutionalist tradition that posited a strict dichotomy of emergency and nonemergency
conditions. See Gross & Ní Aoláin, supra note 55, at 172–74; Lobel, supra note 55, at
1388–91. As Professor Rosa Brooks also notes, “For most of recorded history, humans have
sought to draw sharp lines between war and peace.” Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became
War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon 8 (2016).
257. Hughes emphasized temporariness in his later Blaisdell opinion regarding econo-
mic emergency powers as well. See Levinson, supra note 131, at 731–32.
258. Charles E. Hughes, Some Reflections on Conditions Following the War (Nov. 30,
1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). A version of this address was published seve-
ral months later as Charles Evans Hughes, Our After-War Dangers: In Saving the World
Have We Lost Our Republic?, 61 Forum 237 (1919) [hereinafter Hughes, Our After-War
Dangers].
259. See Hughes, Our After-War Dangers, supra note 258, at 237–38 (warning of such
political opportunism in extending war powers); see also Hughes, Republic After the War,
supra note 233, at 233–35 (warning of the dangers of unaccountable delegations of
legislative power after the war).
260. Hughes, Republic After the War, supra note 233, at 233.
261. See Kessler, supra note 256, at 740–41 (“At war’s end, Hughes called for a rapid
scaling back and judicialization of ‘the astounding spectacle of centralized control’ that
the wartime administrative apparatus had become.” (quoting Ernst, supra note 91, at 44)).
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policies must be prosecuted with the authority and distribution of powers
and according to the methods which pertain to peace.”262
But what if, as Hughes believed was happening, that reversion to
normality was delayed, perhaps for political reasons? And what if there
was no return to normality because the military crisis dragged on indefi-
nitely? Some other astute observers forecasted from the very beginning
of the American participation in the Great War that it would forever
transform constitutional governance. Political scientist and constitutional
scholar Edward Corwin, writing just weeks after the U.S. war declaration,
predicted a “permanent reshaping” of governmental systems and only
partial relaxation of the powers upon which they rest “with the return of
peace.”263 He saw the war as accelerating preexisting forces for consti-
tutional change, especially those favoring federal regulatory power.264
Hughes’s statements after the November 1918 armistice evince an-
xiety about constitutional adjustment, not the confidence of his 1917
wartime speech. “What will it profit the Republic if it gains the whole world
and loses its own soul?” he asked in his 1919 New York Bar Association
address.265 In a lecture the following year, his language was even stronger:
We went to war for liberty and democracy, with the result that
we fed the autocratic appetite. And, through a fiction, permis-
sible only because the courts cannot know what everyone else
knows, we have seen the war powers, which are essential to the
preservation of the nation in time of war, exercised broadly
after the military exigency had passed and in conditions for
which they were never intended . . . .266
He ominously punctuated that statement by declaring: “[W]e may well
wonder in view of the precedents now established whether constitutional
262. Hughes, Our After-War Dangers, supra note 258, at 238. A version of this issue
arose after the Civil War as well. In Stewart v. Kahn, the Supreme Court upheld a Civil War
measure extending the statute of limitations on suits brought against Confederacy resi-
dents. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1871). The Court stated that the war power “is not
limited to victories in the field and dispersion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it
inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to
remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress.” Id.
263. Edward S. Corwin, War, the Constitution Moulder, 11 New Republic 153, 153
(1917), http://www.unz.org/Pub/NewRepublic-1917jun09-00153?View=PDF (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
264. Id. at 155.
265. Hughes, Republic After the War, supra note 233, at 233; see also Hughes, Our
After-War Dangers, supra note 258, at 237.
266. Charles E. Hughes, Some Observations on Legal Education and Democratic
Progress 4 (June 21, 1920) [hereinafter Hughes, Some Observations] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Hon. Charles Hughes Warns of Intolerable Personal
Government, Harv. Crimson (June 22, 1920), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1920/
6/22/hon-charles-hughes-warns-of-intolerable/ [http://perma.cc/PA64-N4WG] (describing
the speech as “a warning against the tendencies among American lawmakers and the
government, toward autocracy”).
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government as heretofore maintained in this republic could survive
another great war even victoriously waged.”267
When the political branches were slow to yield their temporary war-
time powers, Hughes unsuccessfully petitioned courts to flip the switch.
The world—and the United States’ position in it—was changing, and
Hughes’s doctrinal solution proved inadequate. Post–World War I events
showed that in articulating a constitutional framework for waging success-
ful war, Hughes failed to develop a clear and stable definition of success,
especially one that could endure new developments in American security
strategy.
A. The Cable Seizure Case
The case of Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson is little-known because it
was rendered moot before the Supreme Court could consider its merits.268
It features, however, two of the sharpest legal minds at the time—Hughes
and federal district court Judge Learned Hand—squaring off across
Hand’s bench about what waging war successfully really meant.
The case arose from a federal government seizure, pursuant to powers
delegated by Congress, of the undersea communications cables operated
by private American companies.269 This would not have been very legally
controversial, especially under Hughes’s theories of expansive war powers,
but for an important wrinkle: The seizure did not occur until shortly after
the United States and its European partners declared an armistice with
Germany and the other Central Powers.270 The fighting in Europe had
essentially halted. This was more than a ceasefire, as the negotiated terms
with the Allies required Germany to withdraw its troops and hand over
the bulk of its navy.271 The resulting case showed how difficult it was to
turn off modern war powers once they were turned on.
1. The Undersea Cable Seizure. — In the new era of total war, telecom-
munications infrastructure was a critical resource because war efforts
depended so much on the free flow of information. News was tied to
government propaganda efforts, business correspondence was key to
industrial production, and military communications were vulnerable to
267. Hughes, Some Observations, supra note 266, at 4; see also Ernst, supra note 91, at
44 (discussing Hughes’s postwar concern about wartime administrative bureaucracy); James
A. Henretta, Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America, 24 Law &
Hist. Rev. 115, 157 (2006) (same). The contrast between Hughes’s 1917 addresses and his
post-armistice speeches illustrates Professor James Henretta’s observation that Hughes
“sensed both the allure and the threat of a national bureaucratic order.” Id. at 170–71.
268. 255 F. 99 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d as moot, 250 U.S. 360 (1919).
269. Id. at 99–100.
270. Id. at 100 (noting the seizure took place on November 16, 1918, five days after
the armistice was signed).
271. See Gordon Brook-Shepherd, November 1918: The Last Act of the Great War
376–77 (1981); Keegan, supra note 7, at 447–50.
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espionage and counterespionage.272 Because the war was global, under-
sea telegraph cables were especially important. Britain, cognizant of the
need to maintain control of its worldwide empire, had recognized marine
cables’ strategic importance in the decades leading up to war,273 and
from the very start of the conflict Britain and Germany had engaged in
naval efforts to sever each other’s undersea communication links.274 The
United States was a latecomer to this reality, relying heavily on foreign
(especially British-controlled) communication networks.275
To help protect American communications infrastructure and en-
sure that it was used efficiently, Congress passed a joint resolution in July
1918 authorizing
the President during the continuance of the present war . . . ,
whenever he shall deem it necessary for the national security or
defense, to supervise or to take possession and assume control
of any telegraph, telephone, marine cable, or radio system or
systems, . . . and to operate the same in such manner as may be
needful or desirable for the duration of the war . . . .276
The Wilson Administration acted almost immediately in taking control of
the telegraph and telephone lines inside U.S. borders effective August 1.277
This resembled actions taken earlier in the war with respect to the rail-
road network, control of which the government had assumed based on a
prior delegation of wartime power over transportation systems.278 As
mentioned above, the Supreme Court would later uphold all these seizures
as valid exercises of war powers.279
272. See Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and
International Politics 1851–1945, at 138–52 (1991) (“[In World War I,] every piece of
information . . . represented a danger and an opportunity . . . . [T]elecommunications
channels, with their ability to carry vital information fast enough to affect the outcome of a
battle in progress, turned into weapons.”).
273. See P.M. Kennedy, Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914, 86
Eng. Hist. Rev. 728, 729 (1971) (“A widely-developed system was seen to provide the
Empire with an efficient and secure means of communication, and to be a vital part of the
network of imperial defence.”).
274. Headrick, supra note 272, at 138–42.
275. See Jonathan Reed Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American
Security in World War I, at 12–13 (2009) (describing the “large gap” between the United
States and the warring powers in “appreciating the strategic importance of international
communications”).
276. H.R.J. Res. 309, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 904 (1918) (enacted).
277. See Presidential Proclamation, 40 Stat. 1807 (1918); see also May, supra note 62,
at 37.
278. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson’s assumption of
control of domestic transportation systems).
279. See Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 183–88 (1919)
(upholding seizure of telephone lines); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250
U.S. 135, 149–52 (1919) (upholding seizure of railroads).
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Within several months of Congress’s resolution authorizing seizure
of communications system, the Allies and Germany signed the armistice
that ended the remaining fighting on the Western Front. In his address
to Congress on that day, November 11, President Wilson declared: “The
war thus comes to an end, for, having accepted these terms of armistice,
it will be impossible for the German command to renew it.”280
On November 16, almost a week after the armistice was signed,
Postmaster General Albert Burleson, acting under presidential procla-
mation, took control of the undersea cables owned and operated by the
Commercial Cable Company and Commercial Pacific Cable Company.281
Burleson had been planning to seize control of the cables for months
and the President had actually signed the proclamation on November 2,
but it took two more weeks for the orders to be finalized and carried
out, by which time the armistice had come earlier than the Wilson
Administration expected.282
2. Hughes, Hand, and the Cable Companies’ Suit. — The government’s
refusal to immediately relinquish control after the armistice “mystified”
Hughes,283 and he took on the case challenging the government’s actions
as unconstitutional and beyond the scope of Congress’s authorization.
Around this time Hughes had been litigating cases at a fierce pace;284 some
of this work had included serving as counsel in several cases challenging
Food Control Act criminal prosecutions against excessive pricing.285 The
cable seizures seemed like an example of the sort of opportunistic
administrative policymaking and summary procedures that Hughes feared
as unnecessary under the circumstances and, rather than based on spe-
cial expertise, susceptible to antidemocratic political influences.286
Hughes may have already had this case in mind when he remarked
soon after the cable seizure: “So far as we have harnessed our strength
280. Americanism: Woodrow Wilson’s Speeches on the War—Why He Made Them—
and—What They Have Done 138 (Oliver Marble Gable ed., 1918) [hereinafter Wilson’s
Speeches on the War].
281. Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 F. 99, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
282. See Richard R. John, Network Nation: Inventing American Telecommunications
398 (2010) (“[T]he war ended more quickly than the administration had anticipated,
leaving it in the embarrassing position of justifying a takeover as a military necessity after
the military necessity had passed.”); May, supra note 62, at 38–40 (discussing the delay in
issuing the proclamation authorizing the seizure).
283. John, supra note 282, at 403; see also Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, supra
note 80, at 191 (calling the seizures “wholly unwarranted and arbitrary”).
284. In this twenty-eight-month period, he had twenty-five arguments in the Supreme
Court and many others in lower courts and state courts. Hughes, Autobiographical Notes,
supra note 80, at 191 & n.17. “Once he accepted a case, Hughes threw himself into it with
the vigor of a dynamo.” 1 Pusey, supra note 2, at 384.
285. Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, supra note 80, at 192.
286. See Ernst, supra note 91, at 36–43 (“During the twenties, [Hughes] continued to
believe that judges could distinguish applications of administrative expertise from partisan
confiscations of the investments of public utilities and bureaucratic overreaching.”).
664 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:613
for war, we were acting under the Constitution and not in violation of
it.”287 That was our “fighting constitution” exercising the power to wage
war successfully. “But,” he continued,
wherever, in the desire to take advantage of the situation for the
purpose of fastening some new policy upon the country, there
has been resort to arbitrary power through acts unjustified by
real or substantial relation to a state of actual war, such acts will
receive the condemnation they deserve when they are brought
to the determination of the proper tribunals.288
Courts, in other words, might have to step in to enforce the return to
peacetime powers.
The cable seizure suit was Hughes’s “first big case” since the armis-
tice.289 Everyone understood that on the home front a challenging period
of economic readjustment still lay ahead,290 and internationally much
remained unresolved. Wilson was at this time preparing to decamp for
months to Europe—an unprecedented trip for a sitting president—for the
Paris Peace Conference, where the major powers would try to craft a last-
ing settlement.291 The cable seizure was part of the Wilson Administration’s
efforts to control the flow of news coverage from Paris, which it saw as a
natural extension of wartime censorship and propaganda,292 as well as to
ensure government information links between Washington and Europe.293
Wilson announced in his December 2, 1918, annual address to Congress
that in order “to keep an open wire constantly available between Paris
and the Department of State and another between France and the
Department of War,” he had, on the expert advice of cable officials, “tem-
287. Hughes, Our After-War Dangers, supra note 258.
288. Id. Hughes went on to describe the tendency of administrators to want to extend
their authority over, among other things, “instrumentalities of communication” beyond
the period of wartime necessity. See id.
289. Pusey, supra note 2, at 385.
290. See Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 7, at 248–58 (describing the Wilson
Administration’s economic challenges in the postwar years).
291. See Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919, at 4 (2003) (noting Wilson’s decision
“whether or not he should have gone to Paris . . . exercised . . . many of his contem-
poraries”); see also On Wilson at Peace Table the ‘Noes’ Have It, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1918,
at 1 (enumerating arguments against Wilson’s decision to go to Paris) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
292. See May, supra note 62, at 41–42 (“The [cable seizure], [Wilson] said, was taken
in preparation for the peace conference, so ‘news of the next few months may pass with
utmost freedom and with the least possible delay from each side of the sea to the other.’”
(quoting Woodrow Wilson, Sixth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1918), http://
millercenter.org/president/wilson/speeches/speech-3801 [http://perma.cc/GF8B-LTTH])).
293. See Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of
the Army General Staff: 1775–1941, at 247–48 (1986) (documenting those efforts within
the War Department). Some of Wilson’s advisers viewed control of international cables as a
critical strategic resource. See Headrick, supra note 272, at 174–75 (“What worried
[officials] was the national security aspect of communications.”).
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porarily taken over the control of both cables in order that they may be
used as a single system.”294
Hughes, however, viewed the armistice as legally decisive. That event,
he argued, marked the end of the seizure powers delegated by Congress
and of the constitutional powers to delegate them so broadly.295
Hughes’s case came before Judge Learned Hand in the Southern
District of New York. Hand had wrestled earlier in the conflict with war
powers and had pushed back against the government. In July 1917, the
New York postmaster (acting on orders from the same Postmaster General
Burleson) had refused to distribute The Masses magazine on the grounds
that its political cartoons and essays purportedly encouraged public resis-
tance to wartime laws, in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917.296 When
the publisher sued to enjoin the Postmaster’s Office from refusing to
distribute the magazine, Hand interpreted the Espionage Act narrowly,
in a way that did not cover the published expression at issue, by refusing
to assume that Congress had intended to make fullest use of its war
powers. 297 His injunction was quickly and unanimously reversed on
appeal.298 Now, two years later, Hughes hoped that Hand might again
boldly reject administrators’ spacious interpretation of wartime statutory
authority.299
The crux of Hughes’s argument—the courtroom hearing of which
was vibrantly described by the New York Times 300—was that the legislative
condition precedent (national security danger) no longer existed, in
light of the armistice, and neither therefore did the legal authority to
maintain control of his clients’ property. After the armistice, for Hughes,
“[t]here was no basis for any reasonable judgment that there was any
294. Woodrow Wilson, Sixth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1918), in
Presidential Speech Archive, Univ. of Va. Miller Ctr., http://archive.millercenter.org/
president/wilson/speeches/speech-3801 [http://perma.cc/8NQD-BNY9]..
295. Transcript of Record at 6–9, Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360
(1919) (No. 815).
296. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 536–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
297. Id. at 540 (concluding that the Congress, in passing the statute prohibiting “any
willful obstruction of the [federal] recruiting or enlistment”—the statute under which the
postmaster acted—did not intend to criminalize mere “[p]olitical agitation” absent an
active “urging upon others . . . to resist the law”); see also Rabban, supra note 41, at 261–
65; Stone, supra note 235, at 164–70.
298. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 39 (2d Cir. 1917).
299. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 220–22 (1994).
Separately, Hand’s second-guessing of a wartime administrator’s judgment was atypical of
courts at the time, and it likely cost him, for the time being, a promotion to the Second
Circuit. Id.
300. Hughes Assails Seizure of Cables, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1918, at 5. Whereas it had
been hard at times to hear the government lawyers, the Times reported, the ex-Justice’s
“voice carried to every part of the court room” as he argued for three hours in a style
“earnest, vigorous, and enforced with frequent gestures” and with barely a glance at his
notes. Id.; see also Pusey, supra note 2, at 385 (offering a similar account).
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danger to the national security.”301 Even if there remained a technical
state of war pending a formal peace treaty, simply put, danger “no longer
existed.”302
To that Judge Hand replied from the bench:
But the security or defense of the nation . . . depends does
it not, upon the objects for which the war was fought, and until
those objects have been ascertained authoritatively by a peace, it
cannot be said that the security and defense is established. I
take it a war is not for the sake of fighting, but for the sake of
the purposes for which the parties have been engaged.303
Hand turned Hughes’s own reasoning back on him: If the power to
wage war is the power to wage war successfully, then success must be
gauged not necessarily just by the absence of immediate danger but by
reference to the ultimate political aims sought.
In World War I, those aims were a boldly ambitious set of inter-
national security and diplomatic conditions—after all, Wilson had justi-
fied his war declaration request as necessary that the world “be made safe
for democracy”304—not a battlefield line or status. Hand harbored some
Wilsonian visions himself at that time, believing that a lasting peace
would require assertive American involvement in rewriting the rules of
international relations and suppressing nationalistic rivalries.305 “The
termination of fighting by no means is an indication that the security and
defense of the nations, for which they went to war, has been achieved. Is
that not so?” Hand probed.306
Hughes responded that delegated war powers could not be—or at
least in this case should not be—tied to such diffuse and far-reaching
ambitions.307 “I think that what may be achieved, . . . in the sense of the
final results of the war, will probably not be determined during our
301. Hughes Assails Seizure of Cables, supra note 300 (quoting ex-Justice Hughes’s
argument in the cable seizure suit).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Wilson, Declaration of War Against Germany, supra note 48.
305. Gunther, supra note 299, at 314. Professor Gerald Gunther writes:
Hand was incontrovertibly an internationalist . . . convinced the United
States should join the League of Nations even if it meant accepting the
Senate’s reservations about it. To Hand, a reluctance to compromise and
an insistence on perfectionist versions of world order were bound to fail,
and would incur the unacceptable cost of curtailing sharply American
engagements with the rest of the world.
Id.
306. Hughes Assails Seizure of Cables, supra note 300.
307. Id. In addition, Hughes made clear the constitutional limitation in Brief for
Appellants at 38–48, in Transcript of Record, Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S.
360 (1919) (No. 815) (arguing that Congress improperly delegated to the President “arbi-
trary power,” “a power the exercise of which is unreviewable and uncontrollable”).
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lifetime,” Hughes asserted.308 “Congress in this resolution, upon a fair
interpretation of it, had no reference to the national security in the sense
of the ultimate establishment of some conditions, through treaties, which
might promote the general welfare and happiness, and secure the lasting
peace which we all desire to see attained.”309 Such grand ambitions could
not be the legal touchstone for the war powers granted by Congress.
For Hughes (at least as a litigator310), war powers should be tied to
objectively determinable and measurable military aims. They should not
toggle on and off based on “an arbitrary executive fiat, but a finding
upon facts—a reasonable judgment based on a situation in which the
national security could be deemed to be in actual danger.”311 It was one
thing to interpret wartime legal boundaries flexibly to allow expansive
powers even indirectly tied to sustaining military efforts, such as domestic
regulation of agricultural or fuel production and distribution, but it was
quite another to adopt limitless objects of war as the measure of success.
The latter would abolish limits to government powers.
Hughes’s proposed solution would fix war aims—and therefore
government powers, since they are bounded by the necessities to
achieving those aims—to the actual application of military force:
It was not a danger in the sense of a nebulous regard for
possible policies, which could not be vindicated and carried
through by force, that Congress had in mind. It was an actual
state of applied force that we were looking to in arming the
President with these extraordinary powers to take over, seize,
hold, and operate great systems of communication.312
Hughes then quoted to Hand the President’s armistice proclamation
to Congress313 (even taking care to note that he was present for the dra-
matic occasion), which stated that Germany and its allies were militarily
neutralized and powerless to resume the war: “[The President] knew that
the potency of that war had gone, so far as it was directed against the
peace and security of our people, and, therefore, the point was that the
conditions no longer existed when there was any threat at the national
security.”314
This was a tough argument for Hughes, at least as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation. The July 1916 congressional resolution on which the
308. Hughes Assails Seizure of Cables, supra note 300.
309. Id.
310. Hughes’s post-armistice public addresses, described above at supra notes 258–260
and accompanying text, provide a strong basis to believe that this was his view
independent of his client representation.
311. Hughes Assails Seizure of Cables, supra note 300.
312. Id.
313. President’s Address to Congress Announcing Armistice Terms (Nov. 11, 1918), in
Wilson’s Speeches on the War, supra note 280, at 138, 138–40.
314. Hughes Assails Seizure of Cables, supra note 300.
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cable seizure rested expressly authorized such action until ratification of
a peace treaty.315 Now that the substantive scope of war powers had
expanded to account for the new complexities of modern warfare, he
struggled to put forward a workable doctrinal formula for terminating
those powers that accounted for the new complexities of grand war aims.
On that point Judge Hand interrupted:
The purposes for which the war was successfully termi-
nated . . . surely are to be found only in the terms of peace
which are eventually established, and the security of the nation
must be measured, and its defense must be measured, by the
success with which the United States, in the end, the President
and Congress, secure these purposes.316
Put another way, the cessation of fighting is merely a step toward but
not the successful realization of war aims, which at the time Judge Hand
supposed would probably be spelled out in an international peace agree-
ment. He thus confronted Hughes with a version of Hughes’s own axiom:
“Now, then,” if the political branches regard such a far-reaching interna-
tional agreement as the measure of the war’s success, “surely all means
necessary to the achievement of that final end are necessary to the secu-
rity and defense of the nation.”317
In the end, Judge Hand dismissed the suit. He interpreted Congress’s
July 1918 communication-systems resolution as vesting the President with
unreviewable discretion to seize the cables based on his assessment of
security necessities.318 “If the President, who by virtue of his office was
charged with the successful conduct of the war, decided that any such
means were necessary,” he wrote, “his decision was final.”319
Hughes appealed the case on behalf of the cable companies to the
Supreme Court, but the Court dismissed it as moot in June 1919.320 On
May 2, 1919, the government had loosened its management over cable
communication networks and turned back over all control of the cables
to the companies.321 Whereas Postmaster General Burleson had hoped to
use exceptional wartime authorities to prove the value and efficiency of
nationalizing communication instrumentalities, his efforts had backfired
315. The July 16, 1917 joint resolution stated that presidentially authorized control of
communications systems “shall not extend beyond the date of the proclamation by the
President of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace.” H.R.J. Res. 309, 65th
Cong., 40 Stat. 904 (1918) (enacted).
316. Hughes Assails Seizure of Cables, supra note 300 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Judge Hand).
317. Id.
318. Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 F. 99, 103–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
319. Id. at 104.
320. Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360, 360 (1919).
321. See May, supra note 62, at 52.
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politically and the practical results of government control instead had
revealed increased inefficiencies.322
B. The Uncertainty of “Successful” War
If the power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully, and
war’s success can be assessed only by reference to its political aims, then
the constitutional boundaries of the power are a function of strategy, or a
process of matching ends and the means to achieve them. In his “fighting
constitution” speech and in his cable seizure litigation, Hughes evinced
confidence that the reasonable necessity of proposed means for waging
war can be assessed objectively using traditional legal analytic tools. But
what about the definability of war ends? This too Hughes seemed certain
of. Yet war ends are uncertain and shifting concepts.323 Before they are
pinned down, how can one assess the reasonableness of the means to
achieve them?
In his written opinion holding for the government in the cable
seizure case, Judge Hand offered in dicta his own general understanding
of war aims:
War is not the release of primitive combative instincts; it is an
enterprise conducted for purposes consciously understood,
whose realization gives to it its only rational significance. The
national security and defense is to be judged not by the imme-
diate present, but by the stability of the ensuing state of peace.
The terms of the final conventions, the success of the nation in
achieving the aims with which it set out, and which it may have
adopted during the progress of war, are the measure of that
security and defense. Those aims, whatever they are, are deemed
essential to some vital national interest, not necessarily confined
to freedom from immediate invasion.324
There are several crucial aspects of this statement. First, Hand
emphasized the points from his courtroom colloquy with Hughes: that
war aims are inherently political, that they may shift over time (including
during the course of a war), and that their fulfillment is sometimes diffi-
cult to assess.325 Furthermore, Hand captured the idea that American
national defense could no longer, if it ever could, be assessed narrowly in
terms of protection from invasion. World War I took this point to an
322. See John, supra note 282, at 395–404; May, supra note 62, at 40–52.
323. See generally Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 391 (2013)
(arguing intertwining military and civilian components of modern war renders obsolete
normative limits on warfare based on combat).
324. Burleson, 255 F. at 105–06 (footnote omitted).
325. Philip Bobbitt has described military victory in a similar fashion. See Philip Bobbitt,
Terror and Consent 187 (2009) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Terror and Consent] (“Victory is not
simply the defeat of the enemy; it is the achievement of the war aim.”).
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extreme, insofar as Wilson had defined U.S. war aims as the construction
of an entire new world order.326 Wilson viewed as essential to American
security the replacing of traditional European balance-of-power interna-
tional politics with a new system built upon new rules of diplomacy, ideals
such as national self-determination, and orderly and collective responses
to aggression and breakdowns in peace.327
Even if American aims in World War I had been defined more
modestly, however, the cable seizure case helps show that the new foreign
policy roles the United States adopted as a major global player compli-
cated Hughes’s idea of toggling between war powers and peace powers.
Geopolitical conditions had changed: Increasingly, American defense
imperatives were tied to events beyond its own borders and shores,
making it all the more difficult to determine a baseline condition of secu-
rity. The result of this external shift was that internal war powers could not
easily retract into their peacetime configuration.
Judge Hand’s response to Hughes’s plea that the curtain be drawn
quickly and conclusively on war powers presaged—but in a much more
sophisticated form—several Supreme Court holdings that soon followed.
In a pair of cases decided in June 1919, the Court upheld the validity of
federal control of telephone and railway rates based on statutes granting
wartime authority, even after the armistice.328 In Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., the Court in December 1919 upheld as within
Congress’s war powers the War-Time Prohibition Act, which prohibited
liquor traffic in order to maintain war efficiency and aid in military
demobilization, even though Congress did not pass that Act until ten
days after the signing of the armistice.329 Justice Brandeis, writing for the
Court, rejected the liquor company’s challenge that Congress’s war
powers were now inoperative.330 Three weeks later, in Ruppert v. Caffey,
the Supreme Court extended that ruling, sustaining a post-armistice ban
of nonintoxicating beer as a valid exercise of Congress’s war powers.331
These rulings did not stop Hughes from pressing his arguments about
war termination and the diminished powers that went with it. In a set of
326. See Herring, supra note 3, at 411–12.
327. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson’s motivations for
bringing the United States into World War I).
328. See Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 183 (1919) (affirming
government control of telephone rates); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer,
250 U.S. 135, 148 (1919) (affirming government control of railway rates).
329. 251 U.S. 146, 158–63 (1919).
330. Id. The challengers argued (as Hughes had) both that the armistice signaled the
end of the war and that the circumstances of national danger had, in fact, ceased. The
Court rejected these arguments. Id.
331. 251 U.S. 264, 301–02 (1920) (upholding broadened prohibition measures as
within the government’s war powers, notwithstanding changes in the post-armistice secu-
rity situation).
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1920 appeals to the Supreme Court, Hughes challenged war-profiteering
cases brought under the Food and Fuel Control Act on due process
grounds as well as the expiration of the war.332 These convictions were
overturned the next year on due process grounds, so the Court never
reached Hughes’s argument that whatever vestige of war may have re-
mained in the prohibition cases, by now “the tenuous threat” underlying
government war power had “long since diminished to nothingness and
wholly disappeared.”333
C. The Power to Wage War Successfully After the Great War
The anxieties Hughes harbored in the immediate postwar period
about war powers overreach seem mostly to have dissipated by the mid-
1920s. When he published his 1927 Columbia University Lectures the
following year as a book,334 Hughes drew large chunks of text almost ver-
batim from his 1917 speech for his section on war powers. He also used
the maxims that “[w]e have a fighting constitution” and that “[t]he power
to wage war is the power to wage war successfully,” which were originally
found in the body and conclusion of that speech, in the opening of his
book section.335 Whatever his later misgivings about their extended app-
lication, these had not simply been rhetorical flourishes uttered in a
moment of wartime fervor; they remained central to his theory of war
powers.
Although he did not explain so, Hughes’s post-armistice anxieties
were probably allayed by two factors, one political and one judicial. On
the political side, President Warren Harding pledged the return to “nor-
malcy” in his 1921 inaugural address.336 Hughes would serve as Harding’s
Secretary of State, and after the President signed Congress’s joint decla-
ration ending the war with Germany in July 1921,337 Hughes negotiated
the formal peace treaty with Berlin.338 Those events and the lapsing or le-
gislative repeal of wartime regulation soon thereafter seemed to close the
book on the exercise of World War I war powers and the apparent mo-
332. See May, supra note 62, at 220–23. The lead case was United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
333. Appellee’s Brief at 37, Tedrow v. A.T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co., 255 U.S. 98
(1921) (No. 357). Like Cohen Grocery Co., the Court in this case held the criminal provision
to be unconstitutionally vague. See Tedrow, 255 U.S. at 99.
334. Hughes, The Supreme Court, supra note 252.
335. Id. at 102–03.
336. Warren G. Harding, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1921),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25833 [http://perma.cc/7YHM-SCFL].
337. War with Germany Ended July 2, 1921, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1921, at 18 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
338. Treaty of Peace Between the United States & Germany, U.S.-Ger., Nov. 14, 1921,
42 Stat. 1939; see also Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, supra note 80, at 225–30.
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mentum of bureaucratic statism—at least for the present.339 Government
powers had not snapped back as quickly as he had anticipated, but by the
time he returned to public service, they were substantially receding.
On the judicial side, the Supreme Court around that same time
invested lower courts with at least some role in policing the durational
boundaries of war powers. Though delayed from his perspective, this was
the sort of judicial checking for which Hughes had argued in litigation
and his public addresses.340
Whereas the Court had upheld post-armistice prohibition laws as
valid war power exercises, it did so only having considered—albeit very
deferentially—the prevailing war conditions of their continued exer-
cise.341 In subsequent cases of the early 1920s, the Court asserted a more
active role in reviewing congressional determinations of wartime nece-
ssity. In Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, for example, the Court addressed a
Fifth Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a 1919 congres-
sional statute, still in effect in 1922, that imposed rent control in the
District of Columbia as a war-related emergency.342 In that case, the Court
gave great weight to the legislature’s determination, but it also staked out
the judiciary’s role in weighing evidence and facts to determine whether
a war emergency justifying continued reliance on constitutional war
powers still existed.343 These precedents, especially when combined with
the political shifts just mentioned, would likely have mitigated Hughes’s
concerns that war powers would be perpetuated indefinitely.
1. The Great Depression, Emergency Powers, and War Powers. — Nomi-
nated back to the Court by President Herbert Hoover, Hughes served as
Chief Justice from 1930 to 1941.344 Hughes’s return to the bench coin-
339. See Henretta, supra note 267, at 147–48 (describing Hughes’s worries of postwar
bureaucratic statism as premature, in light of subsequent political developments).
340. See supra notes 259–262, 283–288 and accompanying text (describing Hughes’s
view that, with the war won, courts should ensure government powers retract to peacetime
levels).
341. See Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 301 (1920); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 163 (1919); see also May, supra note 62, at 191–207
(discussing these decisions as establishing some role for courts in assessing the actual state
of wartime emergency justifying congressional reliance on war powers). In his 1927
Columbia lectures, Hughes cited Hamilton in noting the Supreme Court’s recognition
“that the war power of the United States, like its other powers and like the police power of
the States, is subject to applicable constitutional limitations.” Hughes, The Supreme
Court, supra note 252, at 108.
342. 264 U.S. 543, 546 (1924).
343. Id. at 546–49; see also May, supra note 62, at 241 (concluding from Chastleton that
“[t]he court thus rejected as constitutionally inadequate the very emergency Congress had
relied upon for the 1922 statute, and which it was then in the process of invoking as the
basis for a further extension”); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The New Deal Court: Emergence of
a New Reason, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1973, 2006 (1990) (discussing Hamilton and Chastleton as
establishing that the existence of a continuing emergency was susceptible to judicial review).
344. Pusey, supra note 2, at 648, 787.
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cided with the onset of the Great Depression and, soon after, Roosevelt’s
New Deal regulatory initiatives that greatly expanded the government’s
administrative role in peacetime.
The new Chief Justice quickly confronted questions of whether and
how to apply his theories of wartime government emergency power to a
peacetime context. Indeed, in responding to the Depression, the archi-
tects of the New Deal deliberately drew on Wilson’s approach during
World War I.345 As mentioned above,346 one case in particular stood out:
In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, a Depression-era case about
state mortgage regulation, Hughes both repeated his “power to wage war
successfully” axiom and attempted to articulate important limits on that
axiom.347 He did so in dicta and as part of a discussion of general emer-
gency powers, not just war powers.
The Blaisdell case arose after Minnesota passed a law in 1933 sus-
pending the obligation of debtors to pay their debts during the period of
widespread economic distress.348 The state law was challenged as a viola-
tion of, among other things, the Contract Clause, which forbids states
from “pass[ing] any . . . law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”349 By
a 5-4 vote, the Court sustained the act as a reasonable exercise of state
police powers in an emergency.350
Writing for the Court, Hughes explained: “While emergency does
not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of
power. . . . The constitutional question presented in the light of an emer-
gency is whether the power possessed embraces the particular exercise of
it in response to particular conditions.”351 And reiterating the thesis from
his 1917 speech, Hughes compared economic emergency powers with
war powers:
[T]he war power of the Federal Government is not created by
the emergency of war, but it is a power given to meet that
emergency. It is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it
permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a
supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation.352
345. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in The
FDR Years 35 (1995) (arguing that World War I served as a rhetorical and political meta-
phor, as well as legal and policy precedent, for New Deal actions and government
responses to the Great Depression).
346. See supra notes 17–19, 105–108 and accompanying text (discussing Blaisdell as
one example of Hughes’s axiom appearing in jurisprudence).
347. 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
348. Id. at 415–18.
349. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416.
350. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444–45 (“[T]hat there were in Minnesota conditions
urgently demanding relief, if power existed to give it, is beyond cavil.”).
351. Id. at 426.
352. Id.
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This was Hughes’s war powers axiom, expressed during the isolation-
ist period in which the American political system was stridently com-
mitted to keeping the United States out of foreign wars. Since Blaisdell is
a case about state (not federal) powers, it is especially mysterious why
Hughes takes this opportunity to restate forcefully his war powers axiom.
But as noted above, legislative responses to the Great Depression were
often analogized at that time to waging war.353 Here their linkage is useful
in justifying expansive and flexible powers to meet crises, showing
Hughes’s evolving constitutional pragmatism in the context of economic
depression.354
Importantly, Hughes went on to also discuss the limits of war powers,
perhaps suggesting that as he contemplated broader contexts for consti-
tutional elasticity, he was particularly attuned to how that elasticity might
be constrained. Here in the context of state economic emergency powers,
for example, Hughes repeated his same constitutional limitations men-
tioned above with respect to war powers.355 Certain provisions, including
individual rights and constitutional processes, remain inflexible if the
text admits no room for interpretation:
[E]ven the war power does not remove constitutional limita-
tions safeguarding essential liberties. When the provisions of the
Constitution, in grant or restriction, are specific, so particular-
ized as not to admit of construction, no question is presented.
Thus, emergency would not permit a State to have more than
two Senators in the Congress, or permit the election of President
by a general popular vote without regard to the number of
electors to which the States are respectively entitled . . . . But
where constitutional grants and limitations of power are set
forth in general clauses, which afford a broad outline, the
process of construction is essential to fill in the details.356
Whereas he viewed the Contract Clause as sufficiently vague that its
meaning could bend in emergency or war, Hughes believed the right to a
jury trial or the process for electing a president are so carefully spelled
out that they must remain fixed. Like his war powers speech, this line-
drawing helps contain the sweep of emergency powers but offers no fur-
ther normative reasoning as to why textually precise provisions deserve
protection from emergency pliancy.
Likely with the post–World War I experience in mind, Hughes also
repeatedly emphasized throughout the Blaisdell opinion the tempora-
353. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 345.
354. See 2 Pusey, supra note 2, at 699–700 (calling Hughes’s Blaisdell ruling “a narrow
victory for forward-marching constitutionalism”).
355. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
356. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426.
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riness of the economic emergency measures at issue.357 Expansive war
powers and emergency powers are tolerably necessary, assumed Hughes,
because they would help restore baseline normalcy. So long as they are
not abusively extended longer than needed by the government for im-
proper ends—and courts could sit in judgment of the reasonableness of
their invocation—emergency powers are essential for states to carry out
their basic public welfare functions.358 Consistent with the observation
above that Hughes would have been reassured by some judicial role in
assessing emergency circumstances,359 he devoted careful attention to the
state’s persuasive claims of urgent economic-crisis conditions.360
The Great Depression would, in fact, end a few years later, but the
normalcy of peace would be short-lived. Hughes retired from the Chief
Justiceship in 1941, only months before the official American entry into
the Second World War.361
2. Waging War Successfully in World War II and Beyond. — Writing at
the height of World War II, Professor Corwin wondered whether “as
circumspect a gentleman as Mr. Hughes” would still express the confi-
dence he did in his famous 1917 speech that the Constitution could
effectively adapt to modern wartime crises “on the basis of the events of
this war to date.”362 Having mostly retreated from public life, Hughes did
not engage publicly on World War II issues and controversies as he had
surrounding World War I.363 We can only speculate about how ensuing
events might have prompted Hughes to revise his theory of the “fighting
constitution,” or how he would have regarded the results of its continued
“marching” to address new strategic challenges.
Corwin describes several features of World War II that challenged
Hughes’s prior optimism that American wartime constitutionalism would
bend but not break. One was executive unilateralism: President Roosevelt’s
tendency to “invade the field of Congress and to set aside Congressional
legislation on his own finding that our war effort will be aided by his
doing so.”364 The prime example that Corwin had in mind here was
357. See id. at 425, 439 (“[A] temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent
with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision . . . .”).
358. See id. (“[T]here has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the
necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and
public welfare.”).
359. See supra notes 340–342 and accompanying text.
360. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442–45.
361. 2 Pusey, supra note 2, at 787–88.
362. Edward S. Corwin, The War and the Constitution: President and Congress, 37
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 18, 24 (1943) [hereinafter Corwin, The War and the Constitution].
363. When Roosevelt asked Hughes in September 1941 to accept an invitation from
the American Bar Association to give a speech and to use it to warn against the Nazi peril,
Hughes declined, explaining that he was no longer giving public addresses. See 2 Pusey,
supra note 2, at 792.
364. Corwin, The War and the Constitution, supra note 362, at 24–25.
676 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:613
Roosevelt’s threat to Congress in September 1942 that, unless it acted on
his recommendation, he would treat as repealed certain provisions of the
Emergency Price Control Act that hindered his ability to control wartime
inflation.365 If Hughes read Corwin’s work, this example would likely have
grabbed his attention; Roosevelt Administration lawyers had often cited
Hughes’s war powers axiom and 1917 speech before and during the war
in justifying price control legislation.366
Hughes seemed confident in 1917 that the lines of power and
responsibility between Congress and the President were fairly clear and
workable, especially if legislative processes and delegations could be
counted on to respond to security imperatives in a timely way. But what if
those lines were fuzzy or those processes not fully responsive? One chal-
lenge that Hughes appeared not to have foreseen or acknowledged was
that as more and more governmental functions were understood as
integral to fighting modern wars, the President might regard them as
within his own responsibilities as commander in chief and wartime chief
executive.
A second feature of World War II that Corwin emphasized as a chal-
lenge to Hughes was the further blurring of wartime and peacetime, and
with it the blurring of exceptional powers and regular ones. “There is
always a tendency, even in democracies,” wrote Corwin in the midst of
the war, “for the emergency device to become the normal.”367 Soon after
that fighting subsided, he declared that the “Constitution of World War I”
had since been “adapted to peacetime uses in an era whose primary
demand upon government is no longer the protection of rights but the
assurance of security.”368 Well before Pearl Harbor and the U.S. decla-
rations of war against the Axis powers, Congress and the President were
wielding a combination of emergency powers and quasi-war powers to aid
the Allies and prepare for possible entry directly into the conflict.369 And
as was the case in World War I, Congress also continued to invoke war
powers to engage in domestic economic regulation well after the fighting
365. Id. at 18–19.
366. See, e.g., supra note 22 and accompanying text (providing one such citation).
367. Corwin, The War and the Constitution, supra note 362, at 25.
368. Corwin, Total War, supra note 210, at 172. In a 1952 memorandum submitted to
the House Judiciary Committee, the Department of Justice quoted Hughes’s 1917 speech
and “power to wage war successfully” axiom to justify extending emergency legislation
enacted during World War II pursuant to Congress’s war powers. See Memorandum from
Joseph C. Duggan, Assistant Attorney Gen., Exec. Adjudications Dep’t, on Emergency Powers
Continuation Act, to Frederick J. Lawton, Dir., Bureau of the Budget (Mar. 19, 1952), in
Emergency Powers Continuation Act: Hearing on H.R.J. Res. 386 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary Subcomm. No. 4, 82d Cong. 369, 371 (1952).
369. Corwin refers to this as “The War Before the War.” See Corwin, Total War, supra
note 210, at 26–29.
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ended in Europe and the Pacific.370 Hughes had assumed relatively clear
delineations of wartime powers from normalcy. World War I blurred the
line at the back end of conflict, and World War II also blurred the line at
the front end.371
The most fundamental challenge of World War II to Hughes’s theory
of exceptional powers to wage war successfully was not, however, that the
President and Congress stretched it aggressively before, during, and after
that conflict. It was a transformation in American grand strategy.372
World War II marked the end of a long pattern, going back to the
Founding, of rapid mobilization for wars followed by almost complete
demobilization after their termination and return to peace.373 Having es-
370. See, e.g., Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141–45 (1948) (upholding
the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 on the basis of war powers, even though it was enacted
after the presidential proclamation terminating World War II hostilities). Writing for the
Court, Justice Douglas noted the possibility of abuse “if the war power can be used in days
of peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts on our society.” Id. at 144. And although
concurring in the judgment, Justice Jackson expressed deep misgivings about long-term
war powers:
I would not be willing to hold that war powers may be indefinitely
prolonged merely by keeping legally alive a state of war that had in fact
ended. I cannot accept the argument that war powers last as long as the
effects and consequences of war, for if so they are permanent—as perma-
nent as the war debts.
Id. at 147 (Jackson, J., concurring).
371. See Mary L. Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences 35–40
(2012) (discussing blurriness of the beginning and end of World War II).
372. As Professor Russell Weigley explains:
[T]hroughout American history until [World War II] . . . [there was] no
national strategy for the employment of force or the threat of force to
attain political ends, except as the nation used force in wartime openly
and directly in pursuit of military victories as complete as was desired or
possible. The only kind of American strategy employing the armed forces
tended to be the most direct kind of military strategy, applied in war.
Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, at xix (1973).
373. Mark Skinner Watson has described the steps in this cycle thus:
In their preliminaries, developments, and immediate sequels World
War I and World War II followed a cycle whose phases are well marked:
(1) prior to the war, insufficient military expenditures, based on the
public’s prewar conviction that war could not come to America; (2)
discovery that war could come after all; (3) a belated rush for arms, men,
ships, and planes to overcome the nation’s demonstrated military weak-
ness; (4) advance of the producing and training program, attended by
misunderstandings, delays, and costly outlay, but gradual creation of a
large and powerful army; (5) mounting successes in the field, and even-
tual victory; (6) immediately thereafter, rapid demobilization and disso-
lution of the Army as a powerful fighting force; (7) sharp reduction of
appropriations sought by the military establishment, dictated by concern
over its high cost and for a time by the revived hope that, again, war
would not come to America.
Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations 23 (Ctr. Military
History 1991) (1950). For information on pre–World War I demobilization, see, e.g., Millett
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chewed a sizable standing peacetime military for most of its history, the
United States needed to assemble quickly an adequate fighting force at
the outset of the War of 1812, the Mexican–American War, the Spanish–
American War, and World War I. When those wars were won, the forces
were largely disbanded.374
There would be no such thorough and long-term demobilization
after World War II, however.375 After the Allied victory in 1945, the United
States did not retreat (as it had after World War I) from an ambitiously
prominent role as global military power in a vain hope that its sur-
rounding oceans could underwrite much of its security.376 The dawning
of the Cold War entailed maintaining a constant state of military readi-
ness. As many scholars have recognized, throughout the period of World
War II and the Cold War the United States was in a perpetual state of
emergency.377
Illustrative of this strategic and legal transformation, in 1947—a year
before Hughes died and thirty years after his “fighting constitution”
speech—the Department of Justice invoked Hughes’s axiom to justify
proposed programs of universal military training. It argued that in the
context of modern warfare, only by preparing adequately in peacetime
could the United States expect to prevail when future conflict erupts:
The events of the past decade have amply demonstrated
that it is too late to improvise armies when war starts or is
declared—the latter generally after the attack has started and
the enemy invasion is well under way. And the latest scientific
et al., supra note 141, at 133–34 (describing sudden mobilization for the Mexican–American
War); id. at 218–19 (detailing rapid post–Civil War demobilization); id. at 256–57 (descri-
bing rapid mobilization for the Spanish–American War).
374. See Abbott A. Brayton, American Reserve Policies Since World War II, 36 Military
Aff. 139, 139 (1972) (describing reluctance of Congress to maintain “a large peacetime
military establishment”); see also Millett et al., supra note 141, at 108–13 (noting that
while in 1815 Congress established a sizable peacetime army of 12,000 and a long-term
naval development program, “by the 1820s . . . the Army and Navy entered an era of
neglect”).
375. See Griffin, Long Wars, supra note 43, at 59–60 (discussing the permanent state
of military readiness after the Second World War); Stephen Daggett & Amy Belasco, Cong.
Research Serv., RL31349, Defense Budget for FY2003: Data Summary 16 (2002), http://
www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/9665.pdf [http://perma.cc/R462-ZERU] (showing con-
tinued high levels of military forces after the Second World War).
376. See John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience 53–54
(2003) (discussing the post–Second World War turn toward collective security and
alliances); Herring, supra note 3, at 595 (describing the post–Second World War transfor-
mation in American security strategy). NSC-68, a sweeping national security policy docu-
ment approved by President Harry Truman in 1950, called for massive military spending
to combat the Soviet threat. See id. at 638.
377. See Dudziak, supra note 371, at 66–72 (discussing the constant sense of “impend-
ing nuclear annihilation”); Lobel, supra note 55, at 1400–04 (“[T]he era of our greatest
international power and security has coincided with a mentality of great fear for our own
national survival.”).
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developments foreshadow a time when an even shorter period
of grace will be available to nations whose peaceable intentions
and limitless resources invite aggressive action from without.
Chief Justice Hughes has pointed out that the war power of the
federal government is the “power to wage war successfully.” The
power to “provide for the common Defense” must be the power
to provide in time of peace for the protection of the Nation. “In
time of peace prepare for war” is not only good sense, it is also
sound constitutional law.378
Hughes had always acknowledged that some war powers were nece-
ssarily activated before the start of a war, to reasonably enable prepara-
tion for it.379 But he also sought limiting principles that would constrain
their use.380 The onset of the Cold War defied not only Hughes’s prior
efforts to confine war powers temporally to military crisis situations but
also his efforts to tie them to objectively measurable outcomes.
The new U.S. strategy to emerge in the years that followed aimed
primarily at deterring a major superpower war, including a nuclear war,
with the Soviet Union. Moreover, it aimed at deterring a war that would
not likely start with attacks directly against American territory but against
American allies halfway around the world. This strategy involved over-
turning assumptions that the United States could defend itself without
permanently maintaining a grand military force.381 The United States
also formed defensive alliances, once seen aversively as drawing the United
States into wars, but now—when combined with large military forces
stationed abroad—seen as critical to preventing wars.382
Such a strategy of deterrence—maintaining the capacity and per-
ceived will to make war to dissuade others from doing so—fits uncom-
fortably with a theory of war powers triggered by the onset of war.383 At
the end of World War I, Hughes worried that unaccountable bureaucrats
378. See Authority to Establish System of Universal Military Training, 1 Op. O.L.C.
Supp. 17, 22 (1947) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426
(1934)).
379. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 327–28 (1936) (sustaining
validity of dam construction in part to ensure adequate electrical supply to meet defense
needs in the event of war).
380. See supra section III.A.2 (discussing Hughes’s role in litigating a case challenging
the exercise of war powers after the signing of the armistice).
381. See supra notes 375–377 and accompanying text (discussing the historically
anomalous lack of demobilization after World War II).
382. See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History 26–32 (2005) (describing
the formation of NATO); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment 54–88 (1982)
(describing the implementation of the U.S. policy of containment during the Cold War);
see also Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles 11–15 (2002) (describing the “revolution-
ary” nature of the concept of deterrence, as used by the United States in the Cold War).
383. See Griffin, Long Wars, supra note 43, at 96 (describing the “erasure of a clear
distinction between wartime and peacetime” as fitting uncomfortably with “long-standing
American values”).
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and political incentives would unnecessarily prolong war powers.384 Now
it was American security strategy that pitted Hughes’s pragmatic flexi-
bility to protect security against his desire to cabin exceptional powers to
temporally discrete, aberrational crises. Throughout the Cold War, the
United States was simultaneously in a constant state of war as well as a
constant state of nonwar.385 It was often involved in regional conflicts and
always in a state of determined military readiness, but the ultimate cata-
clysmic superpower conflict it planned for never occurred.
* * *
As discussed above, Hughes argued to Judge Hand that war powers
should be tied to objectively determinable and measurable military
aims.386 A fact-finder should be able to assess whether claimed powers are
reasonably necessary to achieve war ends.387 That task is difficult enough
when the measure of success is military victory; it is much harder still
when the measure of success is the absence of military conflict.388
By tying the scope of war powers to the necessities of successful war-
waging, Hughes’s “fighting constitution” theory offered a pragmatic
scheme for addressing the immediate security challenges of World War I.
For Hughes, the most important limit was a strict temporal one, which he
assumed would flow naturally from the formula itself: A “successful” war
would, upon victory, turn off the very powers that enabled it. While focus-
ing on the challenges of how to wage successful war, he failed to develop
a workable understanding of success, especially one that could withstand
new developments in American security strategy.
CONCLUSION: OUR FIGHTING CONSTITUTION 100 YEARS LATER
Studying Hughes’s 1917 speech today, almost exactly a century after
he delivered it, one is struck by both its timeless and anachronistic
features. The details of Congress’s conscription and economic powers
and the concomitant limits on individual and economic freedoms are of
a bygone era, but the central claim that our “fighting constitution”
confers flexible powers to “wage war successfully” still holds. Hughes was
right that, especially with regard to national defense, the Constitution
384. See supra section III.B.
385. See, e.g., Griffin, Long Wars, supra note 43, at 96 (noting that throughout the
Cold War there was not a clear distinction between “wartime and peacetime”).
386. See supra section III.A.2.
387. See supra notes 259–267 and accompanying text (addressing Hughes’s concep-
tion of the role of courts in determining the need for emergency powers).
388. See Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein, Deterrence and the Cold War, 110
Pol. Sci. Q. 157, 166–74 (1995) (discussing difficulties of measuring whether Cold War
deterrence was succeeding or exacerbating superpower tensions and measuring how much
deterrence was sufficient).
2017] THE POWER TO WAGE WAR SUCCESSFULLY 681
“marches.” It adjusts to strategic context, and to the means and ends of
American military power. In World War I, the Constitution marched at a
very fast clip.
Keeping that depiction in mind, examining Hughes’s early twen-
tieth-century war powers speech today helps put some features of our
twenty-first-century “fighting constitution” in perspective. First and
foremost, the main focus of Hughes’s speech—on the absolute scope of
Congress’s substantive powers to wage war once initiated—was until only
recently almost extinct from constitutional debates.389 Open a modern
treatise or casebook on constitutional powers and foreign affairs and you
will see chapters on “war powers” that are devoted nearly entirely to
unresolved interbranch questions: how the power to initiate conflict is
distributed between Congress and the President, and the extent to which
Congress can bind the President’s commander-in-chief discretion.390 You
will find little discussion of Congress’s substantive war-waging powers
themselves.391
This is not because the scope of Congress’s war powers has receded.
It has certainly not, at least not in an absolute sense. It is because the
government’s normal, everyday powers—what Hughes called the consti-
tutional “methods of peace”392—are now so capacious that the constitu-
tional war powers are rarely needed (at least not as a standalone basis) to
justify many actions beyond direct engagement with enemy forces.
In a relative sense, legislative war powers have diminished because
other powers have grown so vastly in the last century. For starters, every-
day federal powers have expanded dramatically since Hughes spoke of
our wartime Constitution. All of the domestic economic regulations justi-
fied during World War I only as an exercise of the constitutional war
power could, by the end of the Second World War, have been justified
under the Commerce Clause—even in peacetime—because of New Deal–
era precedents that developed in that interim.393 Indeed, expansions of
389. See supra section I.A.1.
390. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and
Materials 207–309 (4th ed. 2011); Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 25–131 (6th
ed. 2016); Thomas M. Franck et al., Foreign Relations and National Security Law 491–700
(4th ed. 2012).
391. But see infra notes 399–401 and accompanying text (describing brief treatment
in books by Louis Henkin and Arthur Schlesinger).
392. See supra notes 260–262 and accompanying text.
393. See Corwin, Our Constitutional Revolution, supra note 143, at 277 (describing
the result of the New Deal and World War II as a “tremendous increase in the powers of
the National Government”); see also Corwin, The War and the Constitution, supra note
362, at 25 (“[T]he operative Constitution of World War I has become since then, under
the New Deal, the everyday Constitution of the Country.”).
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national government power during World War I served as an explicit
legal and political model for New Deal expansions.394
Doctrines and the exercise of nonwar emergency legislative powers
have expanded, too. Since World War I, Congress has passed hundreds of
emergency power provisions—some usually lying dormant, some regularly
in use—that the President may activate by proclaiming a national emer-
gency.395 Furthermore, legislative war powers have grown less important
over the past century because the President’s Article II powers outside of
war contexts have also expanded so dramatically. Besides his commander-
in-chief powers, the modern President wields enormous power by virtue
of his inherent executive powers to protect the nation’s security and his
foreign relations powers—during wartime or not.396 Again, the marginal
powers unlocked by a state of war have diminished because the perma-
nent baseline of presidential powers is so high.
Looking back, World War I was very likely the pivotal moment in
American history when—by virtue of war powers and the Hughesian
notion that the power to wage war was the power to wage total war
successfully—the differential between the federal government’s war powers
and its normal, peacetime powers reached its apex. War has continued to
become more complex, but constitutional war powers, especially legis-
lative ones, have not had to keep up in part because other constitutional
powers now do so much work.
If questions about Congress’s wartime powers have faded, does
Hughes’s speech tell us anything about the pressing contemporary de-
bate over the President’s authority to use force unilaterally? This is, after
all, what most people think about today when they hear the term “war
powers.” Hughes himself barely mentions this issue because World War I
was in many ways a textbook war: declared by Congress and fought via
traditional battles against a uniformed enemy. It really was not until 1950
394. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 345, at 53 (“Almost every New Deal act or agency
derived, to some extent, from the experience of World War I . . . .”).
395. See Harold C. Relyea, Cong. Research Serv., 98-505 GOV, National Emergency
Powers 1–4 (2007), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4EU-
ZHS2]. The proliferation of emergency-powers laws was so great that in the 1970s the
Senate convened a special committee to sort out how many were in use and by virtue of
which declared emergency. See id. at 9–12. This produced modest procedural reforms. Id.
Although some of these emergency-power statutes rest on war powers, others rest on
independent legislative powers, such as the Article I powers to regulate interstate and
international commerce. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always
Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1263–65
(1988) (describing expansive use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act).
396. Lobel, supra note 55, at 1404–07 (discussing vast scope of modern executive
powers with regard to foreign affairs and security); see also Harold Hongju Koh, The
National Security Constitution 117 (1990) (“[A] combination of executive initiative,
congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance explains why the president almost
invariably wins in foreign affairs.”).
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that Presidents consistently asserted the broad unilateral authority to use
force that they claim today.397 Studying Hughes’s speech a century later
does, however, help put that present controversy in perspective and in a
wider constitutional context.
It is often asserted that the constitutional allocation of the power to
initiate war—does Congress hold the key, or may the President act
unilaterally?—is and has always been among the most consequential
constitutional matters.398 Whereas, for example, Professor Louis Henkin’s
monumental foreign affairs treatise contains only a single page of text
devoted to “[t]he War Power as legislative power,”399 he begins that section
by asserting that “[t]o the Constitutional Fathers, one might guess, the
most important power in foreign relations was the power to declare
war.”400 In his account of the Framers’ allocation of powers in The Imperial
Presidency, historian Arthur Schlesinger calls the Declare War Clause “of
prime importance.”401 Treating the question of who may initiate war as of
paramount constitutional significance is misleading, though, and the
issues Hughes was debating in 1917 undercut this common assertion.
The matter of which branch can take the country to war was for
most of U.S. history not even the most consequential war powers ques-
tion, let alone constitutional question. Through much of that history, the
President had limited practical means to initiate unilateral war because
he commanded only modest national military power except when
Congress declared war and thereby temporarily provided those means. In
practice, any power to initiate war was constrained by limited standing
military might. Once warfare became “total” in the early twentieth
century,402 by contrast, the Necessary and Proper Clause403 became the
basis for completely transforming a largely laissez faire system into a
centrally administered statist one and subordinating a state militia system
397. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
398. See William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 Ind. L.J.
1333, 1333 (2006) (“Few areas of constitutional law have produced as much heated debate
as the war powers area, heat produced in no small part by the passionate belief that this is
a subject of incalculable consequence.”). As Justice Story wrote in 1833: “[T]he power of
declaring war is not only the highest sovereign prerogative,” but it “is in its own nature and
effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the succes-
sive review of all the councils of the nation.” 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1166 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
399. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 67–68 (2d ed.
1996).
400. Id. at 67.
401. Schlesinger, supra note 44, at 3.
402. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text (describing Hughes’s interpre-
tation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in his war powers thought).
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to the federal government’s authority to compel directly anybody into
national military service.404
Of course war initiation is an important debate, but studying Hughes’s
“fighting constitution” speech should temper claims about its stakes, at
least relative to other constitutional questions. Historically speaking, the
absolute scope of substantive powers of the national government un-
leashed by a state of war—and more broadly whether the extent and
allocation of government powers in war are supposed to be optimally effec-
tive, minimally necessary, or somewhere in between to defend American
security—has probably been the most consequential constitutional issue.
Hughes does not address war initiation other than to note simply
that among the “carefully distributed” war powers, “[t]o Congress is given
the power ‘to declare war.’”405 That power and substantive powers to wage
war successfully are tightly linked, however. Because the federal govern-
ment now wields so much power regardless of any state of war, it is easy to
forget that, historically, war’s effects on internal constitutional powers
often featured heavily in debates about congressional checks on presi-
dential war-making.406 When war was seen as according extra-energetic
government powers domestically, it was something to be especially feared
by those generally opposed to centralization.
It is no doubt true that in some respect the stakes in the modern war
initiation debate are greater today—especially with respect to effects on
foreign relations—than they were earlier in American history. That is
largely because U.S. military power is now so permanently formidable. But
reading the Hughes speech today is an important reminder that states of
war or military hostilities no longer open much otherwise-locked legis-
lative power.
I say “much,” not none, because the war against al Qaeda and non-
state terrorist organizations has, since 2001, reopened the issue of the
404. Cf. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 142–44 (1948) (discussing the
Necessary and Proper Clause as basis for expansive government powers in World War I).
405. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, supra note 4, at 233 (quoting U.S.
Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11).
406. Writing as Helvidius in the 1793 Neutrality Controversy, James Madison—one of
the strongest congressionalists among the Founders with regard to war initiation—empha-
sized the need to remove decisions about going to war from the executive branch because
the President stood to gain so much political power in wartime. Helvidius No. 1 (Aug. 24,
1793) in Alexander Hamilton & James Madison, The Pacificus–Helvidius Debates of 1793–
1794, at 58–60 (Liberty Fund 2007) (arguing that the “nature and operation” of the war
power is “deliberative” and “legislative,” not “executive”). See generally Robert A. Taft, A
Foreign Policy for Americans 11–12 (1951) (“The results of war may be almost as bad as
the destruction of liberty and, in fact, may lead, even if the war is won, to something very
close to the destruction of liberty at home. . . . [War] actually promotes dictatorship and
totalitarian government throughout the world.”).
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scope of the substantive war power.407 Hughes’s axiom, after lying some-
what dormant, made a reappearance in Bush and Obama Administration
legal justifications for wartime powers in combating terrorist enemies—
powers such as using military force to subdue enemies domestically,
trying enemy fighters for war crimes in military commissions, and detain-
ing captured fighters.408
On the one hand, these claimed powers seem exceptional because
the war against transnational terrorist organizations lacks the geographic,
temporal and other boundaries usually associated with modern warfare.
On the other hand, these powers are remarkably ordinary and limited;
the context in which the government seeks to use them is extraordinary,
but these measures themselves are quite traditional to military conflict,
more akin to the wartime powers that the constitutional Framers envi-
sioned than those Hughes defended in waging total war. Professor Rosa
Brooks, for example, argues that “[s]ince the 9/11 attacks, the blurring
of the boundaries between war and peace enabled successful presidential
administrations to embrace” a broad range of troubling coercive practices
and the militarization of domestic policy and politics.409 Compared to
transformations of World War I America, however, these practices and
phenomena are actually quite contained.
This ongoing armed conflict with transnational terrorist groups has
also made Hughes’s post-armistice concerns about indefinitely protracted
war powers seem prophetic. Many critics of invoking war powers to combat
al Qaeda and related terrorist groups point to the perpetual duration of
this conflict. A war against sprawling terrorist networks, they point out with
a faint echo of Hughes’s own arguments in Burleson, is unlikely to end
conclusively in the foreseeable future, so applying legal rules or powers
premised on traditional wars among states risks overturning fundamental
but fragile value balances.410 Even in upholding the detention of enemy
combatants captured and removed from Afghanistan soon after the 9/11
attacks, Justice O’Connor wrote forewarningly for the Court in 2004 that
at some point an indefinite duration might cause traditional legal doc-
407. Cf. Barron, supra note 35, at 386 (“[T]he battle lines with Congress would be
drawn over how, rather than whether, this new [global war on terror] should be fought.”
(emphasis added)).
408. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
409. Brooks, supra note 256, at 343–44.
410. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029, 1033
(2004) (“[I]f we choose to call this a war, it will be endless. This means that we not only
subject everybody to the risk of detention by the Commander in Chief, but we subject every-
body to the risk of endless detention.”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow:
The Disturbing Prospect of a War Without End, 2 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 53, 56 (2006)
(“Whether or not the conflict against terrorism is a ‘new’ kind of war, the President’s
authority to conduct traditional, temporary wars should not be accepted as justifying the
permanent exercise of the war powers.”).
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trines to “unravel.”411 Writing four years later for the Court in holding
that Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus,
Justice Kennedy cautioned: “Because our Nation’s past military conflicts
have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer
boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues
to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not
have this luxury.”412
One can now see traces of Hughes’s footprints in these words. The
temporally indefinite character of the war against al Qaeda and, more
recently, the Islamic State—and hence temporally indefinite war powers—
is not simply one of attaining a successful military outcome.413 As with the
duration of World War I constitutional powers, it is also a matter of
determining politically what a victory looks like.414
411. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
412. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008).
413. See Bobbitt, Terror and Consent, supra note 325, at 212–13 (discussing the need
to develop new understandings of “success” in waging war against terrorist organizations).
414. See Blum, supra note 323, at 394 (“A successful military campaign . . . is not a
sufficient condition for victory, nor is it always a necessary one. Political, economic, and
civic forces may all shape the longer-term outcome of the war so as to render it an overall
success or failure.”).
